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Abstract
For the past several decades, the majority of courts and commentators have
viewed the Ninth Amendment as a provision justifying judicial enforcement of
unenumerated individual rights against state and federal abridgment. The most
influential advocate of this libertarian reading of the Ninth has been Professor
Randy Barnett who has argued in a number of articles and books that the Ninth
was originally understood as guarding unenumerated natural rights. Recently
uncovered historical evidence, however, suggests that those who framed and
ratified the Ninth Amendment understood the Clause as a guardian of the
retained right to local self-government. Recognizing the challenge this evidence
poses to libertarian theories of the Ninth Amendment, Randy Barnett now argues
that what evidence we have is consistent with both a libertarian and federalist
reading of the Ninth Amendment and that remaining gaps in the historical record
preclude a solely federalist reading of the Ninth.
This article clarifies the distinction between the federalist and libertarian models
of the Ninth Amendment and argues that the two models are in critical ways
incompatible. In addition to critiquing Professor Barnett’s reading of the
historical evidence, I also present newly discovered evidence of the original
meaning of the Ninth which fills in critical gaps in the historical record and
strongly supports an originally federalist understanding of the Amendment. The
article concludes by distinguishing the Ninth from the Tenth Amendment and
considering the potential impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the meaning
and scope of the Ninth.
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The Inescapable Federalism of the Original Ninth Amendment
Kurt T. Lash
Introduction
One of the benefits of using history as a guide to constitutional interpretation is
that it allows for ever-more refined conclusions based on an ever-growing
database of historical evidence. As prior conclusions are reassessed and
reformulated, newer understandings become increasingly stable as the range of
plausible interpretations grows increasingly narrow.
Recently, Ninth
Amendment scholarship has witnessed this kind of aggregated understanding as a
number of works have greatly increased the stock of historical evidence
surrounding the enactment of this heretofore mysterious clause.1 For those
interested in the original meaning of the Constitution, this new evidence provides
a significant opportunity to refine (or alter) our prior assumptions about the Ninth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut2 set the stage for the
first modern debate over the meaning of the Ninth Amendment. The majority of
the Justices in Griswold accepted the Ninth as textual support for judicial
enforcement of a broad array of individual rights.3 The dissenting Justices
claimed the Ninth simply mirrored the Tenth as a general statement of limited
federal power.4 In the decades that followed, the scholarly debated essentially
echoed the Griswold divide: Most legal commentators accepted the majority’s
libertarian reading of the Ninth,5 while a few dissenters attempted to link the
Professor and W. Joseph Ford Fellow, Loyola Law School (Los Angeles). J.D. Yale
Law School (1992); B.A. Whitman College (1989).
1
Some of the more influential recent works on the Ninth Amendment include, Edward
Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today (1957); Calvin R. Massey,
Silent Rights: The Ninth Amendment and the Constitution's Unenumerated Rights
(1995); Bennett B. Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment (1955); Randy E. Barnett,
Introduction: James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in 1 The Rights Retained by the
People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989);
Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (2004);
Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1980); Russell L. Caplan,
The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 Va. L. Rev. 223 (1983);
Knowlton H. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 Ind. L.J. 309
(1936); Norman Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights...Retained by the People" ?, 37
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 787, 808 (1962); Eugene M. Van Loan, III, Natural Rights and the Ninth
Amendment, 48 B.U. L. Rev. 1, (1968). I too have written on the Ninth. See Kurt T.
Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 331 (2004);
Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 597
(2005).
2
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3
See id. at 484 (Douglas, J.) and id. at 484 (Goldberg, J.).
4
See id. at 518-519 (Black, J.).
5
See e.g., Barnett, 1 The Rights Retained by the People, supra note1 at 13; Barnett,
Restoring the Lost Constitution, supra note 1; Massey, supra note1 at 213; see also
Charles L. Black Jr., A New Birth of Freedom 39 (1997); Mark C. Niles, Ninth
Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis of
Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 85, 117–23 (2000); Suzanne Sherry,
The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1150–55 (1987); Eugene
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Ninth to the state-protective declaration of the Tenth.6 The latter passivefederalist accounts (so-called because they see no active role for the Ninth) failed
to gain significant academic support, leaving the libertarian model as the
predominant view in legal scholarship.
The pre-eminent scholarly standard bearer for the libertarian reading of the Ninth
Amendment is Professor Randy Barnett. Because Professor Barnett is both the
most eloquent and influential advocate of a libertarian reading of the Ninth, this
paper will focus on his arguments in comparing the libertarian and federalist
accounts of the Amendment. Over the past two decades, Barnett has produced a
number of books and articles advocating a libertarian reading of the Ninth
Amendment on both normative and originalist grounds.7 Although Barnett’s
work ranges well beyond the Ninth Amendment, he has consistently argued that
the original meaning of the Ninth supports judicial enforcement of unenumerated
individual natural rights.8 As Barnett believes the principles of the Ninth
Amendment are enforceable by courts of law, I refer to his approach as an active
libertarian reading of the Ninth.9
Recently uncovered historical evidence, however, calls into question the
libertarian reading of the Ninth Amendment. In two prior articles, I presented a
substantial body of evidence indicating that the Ninth was conceived and
received as a federalist provision preserving the people’s retained right to local
self-government.10 This is how its drafter James Madison understood the Clause
and this is how scholars and judges construed the amendment for more than one
M. Van Loan III, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4–24
(1968).
6
See Thomas B. McAffee, Inherent Rights, The Written Constitution, and Popular
Sovereignty: The Founders’ Understanding (2000); Russell L. Caplan, The History and
Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223, 228–59 (1983). Professor Akhil
Amar has suggested the Ninth Amendment protects the collective right of the people to
alter or abolish their Constitution. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 122 (1998)
(“The rights of “the people” affirmed in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments may well
mean more than the right to alter or abolish, but surely they mean this much at their
core.”). As I later explain, I believe that Amar is correct that the collective right to
revolution is one of the retained rights of the People. See infra at ___. Amar also has
long recognized the general federalist relationship of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
See Amar, this note at 123-24.
7
See Randy Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1988);
Randy Barnett, James Madison’s Ninth Amendment, in I The Rights Retained by the
People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment (1989); Randy Barnett,
Implementing the Ninth Amendment (Introduction), in II The Rights Retained by the
People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment (1993); Randy Barnett,
Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (2004); Randy Barnett, The
Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2006).
8
See generally, Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, supra note __; Randy Barnett,
The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2006).
9
See Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 34347 (describing the difference between active and passive interpretations of the Ninth
Amendment.).
10
See Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L.
Rev. 331 (2004); Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex.
L. Rev. 597 (2005).
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hundred years after its enactment. Although libertarian theorists like Professor
Barnett correctly read the Ninth as an active enforceable amendment and not a
mere passive statement of principle, the evidence suggests a much broader
understanding of retained rights prevailed at the time of the Founding than that
proposed by the libertarian model. The Ninth was understood to preserve all
retained rights, both individual and majoritarian (collective), from undue federal
interference, reserving control of the same to state majorities. This makes the
Ninth an active federalist provision that calls upon courts to limit the
interpretation of enumerated federal power in order to preserve the people’s
retained right to local self-government.
Recognizing the challenge this evidence presents to libertarian theories of the
Constitution, Randy Barnett has now drafted a response to both my work and the
work of others on the Ninth Amendment.11 In his response, Barnett concedes
that the evidence supports either an active federalist or active libertarian reading
of the Ninth Amendment.12 However, Barnett downplays the significance of his
conclusion due to his belief that nothing in the federalist model is necessarily
inconsistent with his own libertarian reading of the Ninth.13
Because my articles concentrated more on historical evidence than the
construction of constitutional theory, the specific differences and similarities
between the libertarian and federalist reading of the Ninth remained unclear.14
For example, Randy Barnett and I both concede the possibility that the retained
rights of the Ninth include both individual and collective rights. We also both
agree that the clause is “federalist” to the extent that it binds only the federal
government and not the states. Perhaps, then, Randy and I are merely focusing
on two sides of the same coin: He, emphasizing retained libertarian side of the

11

Randy Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1
(2006).
12
Id. at 21. See also id. at 79 (“the evidence considered in this article, taken
cumulatively, strongly supports the individual natural rights model of the original
meaning of the Ninth Amendment as well as the federalism model”).
13
See id. at 62 (“But even if [retained rights include state rights] this is not logically
inconsistent with a reading of the Ninth Amendment as protecting both individual and
states’ rights from a latitudinarian interpretation of the enumerated powers. [cite omitted]
Were states’ rights included in the meaning along with individual rights, it would simply
broaden the scope of the Ninth Amendment to include situations where no individual
liberty rights were at issue.”). Indeed, Barnett insists that I have misled readers into
thinking our two approaches to the Ninth Amendment are somehow incompatible. Id. at
79.
14
For example, despite my expressly stating otherwise, Barnett still believes I might be
arguing that the Ninth Amendment protects only majoritarian rights. Compare Lash, The
Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 401 (“[T]here is no
textual reason and little historical reason to believe that the “other rights” of the Ninth
Amendment did not include natural rights”), with Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra
note __ at 20 (“Here and elsewhere in his two articles , Lash appears to suggest that the
active federalism approach is meant to protect only collective rights.”). As I hope this
article makes clear, I believe the evidence strongly suggests the Ninth protected both
majoritarian and individual rights. Barnett’s confusion arises from my argument that the
Ninth leaves all such rights under the collective control of local state majorities. See
infra note __ and accompanying text.
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Ninth; I, emphasizing the collective (majoritarian) side. How much substantive
difference can there be between these two positions?
Quite a bit, it turns out. Randy’s libertarian Ninth is the mirror image of his
libertarian reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause. He believes that these two Clauses work in tandem to protect the same
set of unenumerated individual rights and justify judicial enforcement of these
rights against both state and federal action.15 Under my reading of the Ninth
Amendment, however, the original federalist aspect of the Clause remains in
force and requires judicial protection of local self-government today just as it did
in 1791. Not only is it logically impossible for the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments to protect the same set of rights, the Ninth forbids reading the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as negating the general police powers of the
state. Thus, if my reading of the Ninth Amendment is correct, it significantly
undermines Barnett’s theory of a libertarian Constitution.
My prior two law review articles were meant to provide an exhaustive account of
recently uncovered historical materials involving the Ninth Amendment. Even
now, however, I continue to discover previously unknown documents involving
early discussion and application of the Ninth. The most significant of these new
discoveries are presented for the first time in this article. The purpose of this
paper, however, is to focus those aspects of the historical record that have
particular significance in the federalist v. libertarian debate. Following a roughly
chronological approach, I will summarize the relevant evidence and address
Randy Barnett’s arguments as I go. In the penultimate section, I will consider the
relationship between the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.16
I. Preliminary Matters: Defining Terms and Approach
Behold two stories of the Ninth Amendment:
The Libertarian Account
The Ninth Amendment is James Madison’s unique and personal contribution to
our Constitution. Like other Founders, Madison shared the belief that the retained
natural rights of man require no enumeration (indeed, they cannot be
enumerated). Madison added the Ninth Amendment in order to prevent the
erroneous assumption that the rights listed in the Bill of Rights were the only
individual rights retained by the people. Although the Ninth (and the Bill as a
whole) originally restricted only the federal government, the natural rights of
individuals deserve protection from any government, including state
governments. However, it was not until the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868 that courts were authorized to protect unenumerated natural
rights against both state and federal governments. Although no court prior to
15

See, e.g., Barnett, The Lost Constitution, supra note __ at 66 (The Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments both “refer to the same set of unenumerable rights”).
16
This last section by necessity must be no more than a sketch. I present a more
comprehensive text-based theory of the Ninth Amendment in a forthcoming article. See
Kurt T. Lash, Towards a Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment
(forthcoming 2007).
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1965 embraced such a view of the Ninth, it is only due to historic accident and
erroneous judicial interpretations that we have lost sight of this original meaning.
In short, the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments work in tandem, accomplishing
similar goals, through different means.
The Federalist Account
The Ninth Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, has its roots in
proposals submitted by the state ratifying conventions. In addition to a provision
prohibiting the exercise of unenumerated powers, the state conventions also
demanded a clause prohibiting any implied enlargement of enumerated federal
power due to the enactment of the Bill of Rights. Madison’s original draft of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendment expressly addressed these particular concerns of the
states. Although the final version of the Ninth spoke only of the retained rights
of the People, Madison insisted that preserving retained rights and constraining
federal power amounted to the same thing, and that the final version continued to
express the same federalist principle demanded by the state conventions. This is
how Madison described the Ninth in a major speech while the amendment was
under consideration and this is how every scholar and court read the Ninth
Amendment for the next one hundred years. Although the Fourteenth
Amendment adds additional restrictions upon the states, it does not negate the
purpose or operation of the Ninth. In short, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
were meant to work in tandem, accomplishing similar goals, through different
means.
The first account is advocated by Professor Randy Barnett. The second reflects
my reading of the historical evidence. Not all aspects of these two accounts are
mutually exclusive. As I noted above, the federalist model accepts Barnett’s
contention that individual natural rights were among the retained rights of the
people. The key difference between the two accounts involves the scope and
purpose of the Ninth Amendment. The libertarian Ninth Amendment comes into
play whenever a forbidden construction of the Constitution threatens an
individual natural right.17 The federalist Ninth, on the other hand, is triggered
anytime federal power is unjustifiably extended, regardless of whether the
extension affects an individual or collective right (including the right to local
self-government). This distinction is important for two reasons: First, the
federalist model18 embraces a much broader category of rights than that proposed
17

“According to the individual natural rights model, the Ninth Amendment was meant to
preserve the “other” individual natural rights that were “retained by the people.” (draft at
12).
18
In his work, Barnett appears to equate the federalism model with limiting the scope of
federal power. Under this definition Barnett is correct to see close similarities between
the “federalist” model (limiting federal power) and his libertarian model (which limits
both state and federal power). He distinguishes this approach from what he calls the
“collectivist” model of the Ninth Amendment that views the Ninth as preserving local
majoritarian (collective) rights. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 15.
Barnett’s use of the term “federalism” diverges from standard usage of the term as a
reference to a theory of divided government, with some matters delegated to the national
government, and left under the autonomous control of local majorities. Barnett’s
categories also obscure the historical situations in which retained rights had a dual nature,
being both individual and collective at the same time. See infra note __ and
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by the libertarian model. Secondly, the broad category of rights protected under
the federalist model cannot be reconciled with Barnett’s attempt to read the Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments as protecting the same set of liberties and
cumulatively justifying a “presumption of liberty” in matters meant to be left to
state control.
The libertarian account of the Ninth Amendment may seem more intuitively
plausible since it tracks modern conceptions of rights and liberties. The
federalist model, on the other hand, stresses long contested notions of “states
rights” and, from a modern perspective, seems to suggest an overwrought fear of
the federal government. Nevertheless, if the goal is to recover the original
meaning of the Ninth Amendment, we must see terms like “the retained rights of
the people” through the eyes of those who debated and ratified the text. Even if
one is more concerned with the present than the past, today there is a growing
appreciation of how preserving the right to local self-government plays a libertyenhancing role in matters ranging from medicinal use of marijuana to physician
assisted suicide to affirmative action programs in the public schools. Thus, more
than just originalists may be interested in recovering the original understanding
of the Ninth Amendment.
A recurring theme in what follows is the need to hesitate before ascribing modern
implications to terms like “rights” and the retained prerogatives of “the people.”
What today might seem to have a single meaning in 1791 might have referred to
a complicated set of concerns involving both individual and local majoritarian
liberty. Those who debated and ratified the Ninth Amendment were faced with a
problem altogether new in political science: How to create a federalist system of
government whereby both the national and local government remained sovereign
in their respective spheres. Such a division of power had no historical
counterpart.19 Describing it and debating its merits required a new language;
older terms had to be re-conceptualized and adapted to a new theory of divided
government.20 For example, in 1787, the idea of individual natural rights had
deep roots in the common law. The need to protect such rights at a state level
was commonly accepted, even if disputes remained regarding the precise content
of natural rights. At the same time, however, sovereign states also had natural
rights that they retained when they entered into a treaty or compact with another
sovereign.21 The Articles of Confederation, for example, declared that all nonaccompanying text. As I have in previous articles, I continue to distinguish “libertarian”
models of the Ninth (limiting the power of the federal governments to interfere with
individual rights in furtherance of an overall theory of liberty against state and federal
governments) and federalism models of the Ninth (dividing federal and state power in a
manner that preserves the retained right to local self-government). I believe my approach
conforms with standard usage and it allows for the existence of retained rights which
were both individual (in terms of their protection from federal interference) and collective
(in terms of their being retained under the control of local state majorities.
19
See Michael Zuckert, A System Without Precedent: Federalism in the American
Constitution, in The Framing and Ratification of the Constitution, ed., by Leonard W.
Levy and Dennis J. Mahoney (1987) pp. 132-50.
20
See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. Rev. 1425, 1437
(1987).
21
See Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations (1758). Vattel’s work was widely relied
upon at the time of the Founding and for decades afterwards. The first major
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delegated powers jurisdiction and rights were retained to the states.22 If the
Constitution was to be ratified, the state conventions had to be convinced that the
federal government not only lacked power to interfere with individual rights, it
must also lack the authority to interfere with the retained collective rights of the
people in the several states. In this way, debates regarding individual rights
merged with debates regarding states’ rights. As we shall see, these dual
concerns played a critical role in the drafting and public understanding of the
Ninth Amendment.
1. Constitutional Theory and Method
Randy Barnett and I both embrace the method of constitutional interpretation
known as originalism. Originalism seeks the meaning of the text as it was likely
understood by those who added the provision to the Constitution. The method
can be traced back to the Founding generation itself. James Madison, for
example, expressly embraced the idea that the meaning of the Constitution
should reflect the understanding of the ratifiers—in his case, the members of the
state ratifying conventions.23 As Madison wrote during the 1796 debate on the
Jay treaty:
Whatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who
formed our Constitution, the sense of that body could never be regarded
as the oracular guide in the expounding of the Constitution. As the
instrument came from them, it was nothing more than the draught of a
plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into
it, by the voice of the people, speaking through the several state
conventions. If we were to look therefore, for the meaning of the
instrument, beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it not in
the general convention, which proposed, but in the state conventions,
which accepted and ratified the constitution.24
Madison’s emphasis on ratifiers’ understanding reflects the Founders belief in
popular sovereignty. A political theory in ascendancy at the time of the

constitutional treatise by St. George Tucker relied heavily on Vattel. See, e.g., St.
George Tucker, A View of the Constitution, in 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries. Appendix,
Note D 140 (Philadelphia 1803). Others in the Founding generation shared Vattel’s
view that governments in general, and states in particular, had retained natural rights.
See Thomas Jefferson, Draft of Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798), in 5 The
Founders’ Constitution, supra note__, at 134 (“[E]very State has a natural right in cases
not within the compact . . . to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power by
others within their limits . . . .”); see also John Taylor, Constructions Construed and
Constitutions Vindicated 172 (De Capo Press 1970) (1820) (“The states have a natural
right to make all necessary and proper laws within their national powers reserved.”).
22
Art. II, Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union of the United States.
23
Madison first relied on the understanding of the state conventions even before the
states had ratified the Bill of Rights, and he would repeatedly do so throughout his life.
See Madison’s Speech Against the Bank of the United States, in Writings, supra note __
at 480, 482, 489 (discussing how the meaning of the constitution should be interpreted in
light of the understanding of the ratifying conventions).
24
Madison’s Speech on the Jay Treaty, April 6, 1796 Writings at 574-75.

8

Founding,25 popular sovereignty distinguishes the government from the
governed, with only the latter having the sovereign right to establish (or amend)
fundamental law. The governed “speak as a People” when they meet in
convention and debate, vote, and reduce to writing the People’s fundamental
law.26 Because these conventions of the People are responsible for “breathing
life” into the document, it is their understanding of the words that control.
Most originalists today accept popular sovereignty as the normative basis for
their interpretive method, and follow Madison’s lead in treating the
understanding of the ratifiers as the most authoritative word on the original
meaning of the Constitution.27 The originalist work of Randy Barnett, however,
is an exception. Although Barnett accepts (at least provisionally28) the
legitimacy of originalism, he strongly rejects popular sovereignty as a normative
theory of constitutional law. According to Barnett, no person can be bound to
follow the constitution without their consent. Because unanimous consent is
impossible, consent based theories fail to “bind in conscience” anyone who does
not individually consent to the Constitution.29 Popular sovereignty is thus a
flawed theory, for it allows a supermajority (both at the time of adoption and
through later use of Article V) to bind a non-consenting minority. Barnett
believes the only way around this unanimous consent dilemma is by adopting a
constitution that would earn the consent of all reasonable people—a constitution
based on libertarian principles of freedom. It is because Barnett believes that the
original meaning of the Constitution meets this condition that he accepts the
legitimacy of originalism as an interpretive method.30
Barnett’s rejection of popular sovereignty places him in the uncomfortable
position of rejecting the very political theory embraced by those who debated and
adopted the Ninth Amendment.31 This is not a criticism of Barnett’s normative
theory (he may well be correct about constitutional legitimacy). But, as Barnett
himself concedes, “particular items of evidence assume a greater or lessor
importance depending on which version of originalism is being employed.”32
25

See e.g., (“It is indeed a “most excellent maxim, that the original and fountain of all
just power and government is in the people;” and if ever this maxim was fully
demonstrated and exemplified among men, it was in the late American Revolution, where
thirteen governments were taken down from the foundation, and new ones erected wholly
by the people, as an architech would pull down an old building and erect a new one.”),
John Adams, Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States (1787),
reprinted in 1 The Founders’ Constitution at 60. See generally, Gordon Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969).
26
Id. at 328-43 (describing the special legitimacy of conventions).
27
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note __; Keith Whittington,
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note __; Bruce Ackerman, We the People, supra note
__; Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge [others]
28
See Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, supra note __ at 109 (“If the substance of
a constitution’s original meaning falls short of what it takes to establish a legitimate
lawmaking process, then that constitution is not binding and can be ignored . . ..”).
29
See Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, supra note __ at 11-14.
30
Id. at 109-113.
31
See Trevor Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Barnett’s Case for a
Libertarian Constitution, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 839, 846 (2005) (Barnett’s rejecting of the
original theory of the Constitution places him an “a rather awkward position”).
32
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 6.
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Popular sovereignty-based originalism gives substantial weight to the
understanding of the ratifiers, for it is their action and authority that “breathes
life” into the constitutional text. Professor Barnett, however, distinguishes
“original public understanding” from “original ratifier understanding” with his
preference being the latter.33 This distinction has real bite in Barnett’s work. A
theme running throughout his essays involves how the Ninth does not reflect the
concerns declared by the state ratifying conventions.34 As I will explain below, I
believe that Barnett’s rejection of the Founders’ theory of popular sovereignty
critically undermines his analysis of the historical evidence. For now, the reader
should know that the originalist approach of this article follows the popular
sovereigntist originalism of James Madison and affords special consideration and
weight to the concerns and understanding of those who debated and ratified the
text.35
2.

The Pool of Relevant Evidence

The search for original meaning is not the same thing as a search for the original
framers’ private intent. On this point, Randy Barnett and I agree. Whatever
private intentions may have motivated the players in this history, the key inquiry
is determining the likely public meaning of a proposed text. This is the meaning
that is debated and either rejected or ratified. For that reason, although Barnett
and I might give some sources different weight, we generally look to the same
historical sources as relevant to determining the original meaning of the text.
Contemporary use of phrases and terms in the text is relevant, and this can be
identified through public documents (newspapers, official enactments and the
like) or private letters and diaries. The issue which gave rise to the proposed text
is clearly relevant, as are the debates which surrounded its drafting, submission
and ratification. Private statements by those involved are helpful, but only to the
extent that they illuminate likely public understanding.
Post-adoption materials can be relevant, depending on the date of the material
and the degree to which it likely reflects later political disputes as opposed to
reflecting traditional understanding. Although Randy Barnett downplays the
significance of post-adoption commentary in the case of the Ninth Amendment,
this is a departure from his work on other clauses in the Constitution.36 I believe
that post-adoption commentary and usage is particularly helpful in the case of the
Ninth Amendment,37 but none of my conclusions are dependent on postenactment material.
33

See id. at 5-6.
See, for example, Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 17 (“Madison
designed the Ninth Amendment by substantially altering state proposals to address the
concerns expressed during ratification by Federalist supporters of the Constitution.”)
(emphasis in original).
35
Other constitutional scholars who base their work on the theory of popular sovereignty
include Akhil Amar, Keith Whittington, Bruce Ackerman, Michael Kent Curtis, John
Harrison, Michael McConnell, Michael Paulson (103 YLJ 677 Yale Law Journal, A
General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty . . . and Caleb
Nelson (115 HVLR 1559, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction
(also Gary Lawson).
36
See infra, note __ and accompanying text.
37
See generally Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, supra note __.
34
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II. The Concerns Which Triggered the Ninth Amendment
The commonly told story about the birth of the Ninth Amendment recounts how
the Clause was meant to prevent any erroneous implications arising due to the
adoption of the Bill of Rights. Identifying these erroneous implications,
however, leads to one of the first differences between the federalist and
libertarian accounts of the Ninth Amendment. The federalist reading views the
Ninth as having the dual purpose of both restraining power and retaining rights-concerns that were raised by the state ratifying conventions as part of their
demands for a Bill of Rights. Randy Barnett’s libertarian reading, on the other
hand, asserts that the amendment had the single purpose of protecting retained
individual rights38 and that it reflects concerns raised by the Federalists who
originally supported ratification of the Constitution without a Bill of Rights.
1.

The Traditional Account of the Ninth

Most accounts of the Ninth Amendment focus on Madison’s speech to the House
of Representatives where he introduced his proposed Bill of Rights.39 There,
Madison noted that the Federalists had originally resisted a Bill of Rights due to
the danger that such a Bill might be erroneously read as an exhaustive list of the
people’s retained rights. According to Madison, however, this danger might be
“guarded against” by adopting a provision that expressly prohibited such an
erroneous implication.40 The provision he proposed ultimately became the Ninth
Amendment.
This is an accurate, but critically abbreviated, account of the Amendment’s birth.
It makes it appear as if the provision sprang from the mind of Madison and
reflected Federalist concerns, not those of the state conventions. Randy Barnett,
for example, believes that the Ninth was “formulated specifically to respond” to
Federalist objections to adding a Bill of Rights and that securing retained rights
was the “single end” of Madison’s proposal. If true, then this makes the Ninth
Amendment unique among the rest of the Bill of Rights. All the other provisions
in the Bill of Rights have their roots in proposals emanating from the state
conventions and reflect their particular concerns.41 Although he concedes that
state conventions submitted proposals related to the Ninth, Barnett nevertheless
maintains that Madison “substantially alter[ed] state proposals” in order to focus
the Ninth on concerns regarding the people’s retained rights. As Barnett puts it:

38

Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note ___ at 2 (“The purpose of the Ninth
Amendment was to ensure that all individual natural rights had the same stature and force
after some of them were enumerated as before; and its existence argued against a
latitudinarian interpretation of federal power.”); id at 13 (“I have defended the view that
the “other rights” protected by the Ninth Amendment are individual natural rights. [cite
omitted] The purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to ensure that these rights had the
same stature and force after enumeration as before.”).
39
See Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8,
1789), in Writings¸ supra note __ at 437.
40
Id. at 449.
41
For a helpful comparison of the amendments and their state precursors, see Bernard
Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights (1971).
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“In this regard, within the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment
is sui generis. . . . Madison’s version of the Ninth Amendment
was a departure from, rather than an incorporation of, the public
meaning of similarly-worded Anti-federalist inspired state
proposals . . .”42
Barnett’s account uncouples the Ninth from the rest of the Bill of Rights and, in
so doing, distances the Ninth from the state-centered concerns informing the rest
of the Bill.
I believe the evidence supports Barnett’s claim that one of the purposes of the
Ninth Amendment was to address concerns about adding a Bill of Rights.43
However, his attempt to drive a wedge between Madison’s Ninth and concerns
emanating from the states is expressly rebutted by James Madison himself on at
least five different occasions (detailed below). According to Madison, the Ninth
Amendment had the dual purpose of guarding retained rights and limiting undue
enlargement of federal power—and it is this second purpose that ties the Ninth to
the concerns and proposals of the state conventions.
2.

The State Proposals and Madison’s Original Draft of the Ninth
Amendment

Here are Madison’s original drafts of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments:
The exceptions, here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of
particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the
powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations of
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.
...
The powers not delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
states, are reserved to the States respectively.44
These two amendments address two different and equally erroneous readings of
the Constitution. The first, his original draft of the Ninth Amendment, addresses
retained rights and the erroneous enlargement of enumerated federal power. The
second (a draft of the Tenth) addresses the erroneous exercise of unenumerated
federal power. As Madison later explained, the former guards against “a latitude

42

Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 17. See also id. at 75 (“The Ninth
Amendment was invented by James Madison”).
43
Actually, it is misleading to characterize the dangers of adding a Bill of Rights as
solely a Federalist concern, or to claim that the proposals from the states were inspired by
Anti-federalists. The proposed amendments from the state conventions clearly echo the
“dangerous implications” concern, and they were championed by men like Edmund
Randolph whom Madison himself called a “friend of the [proposed] Constitution.” See
infra note __ and accompanying text.
44. House of Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 5 The
Founders’ Constitution, supra note__, at 25–26.
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of interpretation” while the latter “excludes every source of power not within the
Constitution itself.”45
Although Madison’s original draft of the Ninth Amendment addresses both
enlarged powers and retained rights, these two subjects in Madison’s mind were
inextricably linked:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration, and it might follow by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned
into the hands of the general government, and were consequently
insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever
heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this
system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have
attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause
of the 4th resolution (his original draft of the Ninth).46
According to Madison, disparagement of unenumerated rights led to the implied
“assignment” of such rights into the hands of the general government. Such an
implied assignment, of course, would wrongfully enlarge the powers of the
federal government. Madison’s original draft of the Ninth addresses both of
these related problems by guarding “retained rights” and prohibiting
constructions that “enlarge[d] the powers” of the federal government. This same
dual purpose shows up in Madison’s notes for his speech where he writes in
regard to the Ninth: “disparage other rights—or constructively enlarge.”47 His
notes, of course, simply track the express dual-purpose language contained in his
original draft of the Ninth.
Nor is there any evidence that, of the two listed purposes, retaining rights was the
true or “main” purpose of the clause and that constraining power was just a
means to that end. Both the text of the amendment and Madison’s notes treat
both purposes as equally important. In fact, Madison’s private musings on the
subject focused on the need to prevent enlarged federal power. Only months
earlier, Madison had written to Thomas Jefferson regarding the need for a Bill of
rights,

45

James Madison, Speech on the Bank of the United States, in Writings, supra note __ at
489.
46. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8,
1789), in James Madison, Writings, supra note__, at 448–49.
47
See James Madison, Notes for Amendments Speech (1789), in Rights Retained by the
People, supra note __ at 65. Although Randy Barnett discusses some aspects of
Madison’s notes, he does not address the lines that refer to the Ninth Amendment.
Although our received account of his speech does not include his point about enlarged
power, he may have been forced to limit his remarks according to time constraints. A
possibility Randy Barnett also acknowledges. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra
note __ at 34 n.135 (noting Madison’s self-reminder “watch time” in his notes).
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“My own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it
be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the
enumeration.”48
Thus, Madison’s private correspondence, his speech, and the notes for his speech
all expressly link the Ninth to preventing enlarged federal power. In the face of
such express evidence, it is not credible to maintain that Madison’s sole purpose
in proposing the Ninth was to preserve individual rights. Madison was just as
concerned about the enlargement of federal power, and this concern came
straight from the state conventions.
3.

The Proposals of the State Ratifying Conventions

Unlike Madison’s original draft, the final language of the Ninth Amendment
refers only to rights, not powers. Because this particular language cannot be
found in any proposal submitted by the state conventions, some scholars
conclude that the Ninth Amendment was solely Madison’s idea.49 According to
this view, the Ninth reflects Federalist concerns that a list of rights might be read
as an exhaustive list of the people’s retained rights. Anti-federalist concerns
about government powers, on the other hand, were addressed by the Tenth
Amendment.
Reading Madison’s original draft of the Ninth, however, calls this distinction into
question. Madison viewed the Ninth as addressing both rights and powers.
Madison’s speech to the House clearly links the purpose of the Ninth to concerns
about enlarged federal power, and this was a critical concern of the state
conventions. It flips history on its head to say that the Federalists, but not the
anti-federalists in the state ratifying conventions, were concerned about implied
enlargement of federal power. In fact, once one considers the declarations and
proposals submitted by the state conventions, the link between Madison’s Ninth
and the state conventions becomes clear.
Like Madison’s draft of the Ninth and Tenth, the state conventions also saw the
need for a dual strategy to prevent a dangerous expansion of federal power. New
York, for example, submitted the following declarations along with its notice of
ratification.
[T]hat every Power, Jurisdiction and Right, which is not by the said
Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the
departments of the Government thereof, remains to the People of the
several States, or to their respective State Governments to whom they
may have granted the same;
And that those Clauses in the said Constitution, which declare, that
Congress shall not have or exercise certain Powers, do not imply that
48

Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in Writings supra note __ at 420
(emphasis added).
49
In addition to Randy Barnett, the historian Leonard Levy also credited Madison with
conceiving the Ninth entirely on his own. See Leonard Levy, Origins of the Bill of
Rights 247 (1999) (“Madison improvised that proposal. No precise precedent for it
existed.”).
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Congress is entitled to any Powers not given by the said Constitution; but
such Clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified
Powers, or as inserted merely for greater Caution.50
The first of these declares the principle of enumerated power—a principle that
ultimately informs the Tenth Amendment. The second addresses a separate
issue: the implied expansion of federal power that might arise due to the addition
of the Bill of Rights. Other states expressed the same dual concerns. The
Virginia convention, for example, proposed the following two amendments:
First, That each State in the Union shall respectively retain every power,
jurisdiction and right which is not by this Constitution delegated to the
Congress of the United States or to the departments of the Federal
Government.”
...
Seventeenth, That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not
exercise certain powers be not interpreted in any manner whatsoever to
extend the powers of Congress. But that they may be construed either as
making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be the case,
or otherwise as inserted merely for greater caution.51
Once again, the first provision limits the federal government to enumerated
powers while the second limits the implied enlargement of federal power due to
the addition of a Bill of Rights.52 North Carolina followed Virginia’s approach

50. Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in Creating the
Bill of Rights, supra note _, at 21–22; see also 1 Elliot’s Debates, supra note __, at 329
(“Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid cannot be abridged or
violated, and that the explanations aforesaid are consistent with the said Constitution, and
in confidence that the amendments which shall have been proposed to the said
Constitution will receive an early and mature consideration—We the said delegates, in
the name and in the behalf of the people of the state of New York, do, by these presents,
assent to and ratify the said Constitution.”).
51. Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), in The Complete
Bill of Rights, supra note__, at 675. James Madison was a member of the committee that
drafted the Virginia proposal, and he expressly noted the role the Virginia proposals
played in his proposed draft of the Bill of Rights. Letter from James Madison to George
Washington (Nov. 20, 1789), in 2 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 1185
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971).
52
Although New York’s proposal addressed the implied abandonment of the principle of
enumerated federal power, Virginia’s Seventeenth goes further and prohibits any implied
enlargement of even those powers which were enumerated. Patrick Henry in the Virginia
Convention:
“If you will, like the Virginia government, give them knowledge of the extent of
the rights retained by the people, and the powers themselves, they will, if they
be honest men, thank you for it. . . . But if you leave them otherwise, they will
not know how to proceed; and being in a state of uncertainty, they will assume
rather than give up powers by implication. A Bill of rights may be summed up
in a few words. What do they tell us? That our rights are reserved.”
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and submitted the same two proposals.53 Other states submitted related proposals
seeking to limit the construction of federal power.54
Debates and other proceedings of the Convention of Virginia(Richmond; Monday, June
2, 1788). Page 36. Here Henry shows the relationship between retained/reserved rights
and limiting the constructive enlargement of power (by implication).
53
Randy Barnett attempts to disparage North Carolina’s agreement with Virginia as an
unthinking “copying of the Virginia amendments.” See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment,
supra note __ at 42. Barnett’s point is to minimize the degree of agreement with
Virginia’s approach by making North Carolina’s proposals seem rote and ill-considered.
Barnett bases his skepticism on a letter written by William Davie of North Carolina to
James Madison in which Davie notes “[t]hat farrago of amendments borrowed from
Virginia is by no means to be considered the sense of this country.” William Davie to
James Madison, June 10, 1789, 5 Doc. Hist. Of Const. supra note __ at 176. But Davies’
comment went to the bulk of Virginia’s numerous proposals which Madison ultimately
rejected. Davie did not mean to disparage, however, those proposals by the North
Carolina that sought to limit the construction of federal power—in particular the
provisions that echoed Virginia’s 1st and 17th. As Davie goes on to write, he had
“collected with some attention the objections of the honest and serious—they are but few
and perhaps necessary. . . .Instead of a Bill of rights attempting to enumerate the rights of
the individual or the State governments, they seem to prefer some general negative [“as
will” struck out in original] confining Congress to the exercise of the powers particularly
granted, with some express negative restriction in some important cases.” Id. at 177.
Davies letter indicates that even those North Carolinians who counted themselves friends
of the Constitution (Davies’ “honest and serious” men) nevertheless shared the Virginia
convention’s concerns about “state rights” and the need to limit the powers of Congress.
54
See Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 355360. Barnett claims that in previous work I have “greatly overstat[ed] the commonality
of New York and Virginia’s proposals. According to Barnett:
Virginia’s proposal speaks of the retention of “every power jurisdiction and
right” in “each State in the Union.” [cite omitted] In contrast, New York’s
speaks of “every power, Jurisdiction, and Right” remaining in “the People of the
several states, or to their respective state governments, to whom they may have
granted the same.” In this manner, New York’s proposal distinguishes between
“the People” and “state governments” and reserves rights to the people, as
opposed to Virginia’s which refers only to reserving right to the states.”
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 44. Although Barnett here
refers to proposals Madison would rely on in drafting the Tenth Amendment (not the
Ninth), his point goes to the meaning of “the people” in the Ninth Amendment. I have
claimed that all of these state proposals endorsed the addition of amendments that would
protect the rights of the states. See Lash, The Lost Original Meaning, supra note __ at
358. Barnett disagrees by pointing to New York’s proposals which seem to distinguish
the rights of states from the rights of the people. Barnett believes that Madison made the
same distinction when he referred to the retained rights of the people in the Ninth. But
here Barnett falls into the trap of anachronism. Today “the people” sounds in terms of
individual rights, not state rights. This was not true in 1787, and it was most certainly not
true of the New York Convention. New York did not simply refer to “the people.” The
Convention expressly declared all non-delegated power jurisdiction and rights were
reserved to “the people of the several states.” This is the precise language that Barnett
elsewhere recognizes as a declaration of state rights. See Barnett, The Ninth
Amendment, supra note __ at 79 (referring to the precise same language in the
Confederate Constitution). As far as Virginia’s reference to the retained rights of the
states is concerned, this statement is no different from New York’s reference to the
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Madison culled through the various proposals submitted by the state conventions
and “exclud[ed] every proposition of a doubtful & unimportant nature.”
Although not all of Virginia’s (or any states’) proposals made the final cut,
Madison considered the dual strategy of Virginia’s “First” and “Seventeenth”
important enough to add to his list of suggested amendments. Madison’s
proposals thus included two amendments: One declaring the principle of
enumerated power, and a separate amendment prohibiting any implied
enlargement of enumerated federal power.
Here is a side-by-side comparison of Madison’s Ninth and Tenth and Virginia’s
First and Seventeenth:
Madison’s “Tenth”

Virginia’s “First”

The powers not delegated by this Constitution, That each State in the Union
nor prohibited by it to the states,
shall respectively retain every
are reserved to the States respectively.
power, jurisdiction and right,
which is not by this Constitution
delegated to the Congress of the
United States or to the
departments of the Federal
Government.”
Madison’s “Ninth”

Virginia’s “Seventeenth”

The exceptions, here or elsewhere
in the Constitution, made in favor
of particular rights,
shall not be so construed

That those clauses which
declare that Congress shall
not exercise certain powers
be not interpreted

[as to diminish the just importance ]
[of other rights retained by the people, ]
or as to enlarge the powers delegated
by the Constitution;

in any manner whatsoever
to extend the powers
Congress.

but either as actual limitations of such powers,
or as inserted merely for greater caution.

But that they may be construed
either as making exceptions to
the specified powers where this
shall be the case, or otherwise as
inserted merely for greater
caution.

of

retained rights of the people of the states or to their respective state governments. All of
the Founders agreed that powers and rights retained by the states were, in fact, powers
and rights retained by the people in the several states who could delegate them to their
respective state governments as they saw fit. This was a fundamental principle of
popular sovereignty.
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Randy Barnett’s attempt to characterize Madison’s Ninth as a sui generis
provision unrelated to the concerns of the state conventions seems rebutted by a
simple textual comparison of the Ninth with Virginia’s Seventeenth.55 With the
exception of the “rights retained by the people” language, his proposal has clear
counterparts in Virginia’s 17th proposal. More, even Madison’s unique “retained
rights” language cannot be divorced from the concerns of the Virginia
Convention. We know that Madison wished to prevent an implied “assignment”
of unenumerated rights into the hands of the federal government. His language
regarding retained rights prevents such an “assignment” and thus fits with
Virginia’s express concerns about the implied extension of federal power. In
other words, even if we exclude the major part of Madison’s proposal and focus
only on the retained rights langauge, this still reflects the concerns of Virginia
and other state conventions. By including the “enlarged powers” language, the
link to the state convention proposals is obvious.
III. The Final Language of the Ninth Amendment
1.

The Altered Language

On July 21, 1789, the House of Representatives referred Madison’s proposed Bill
of Rights to a Select Committee made up of one member from each state.56 The
Ninth emerged from this committee in what would be its final form:
The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
There are no records of the committee’s discussions or reasoning, so we cannot
know what went into the decision to delete Madison’s original language
regarding the implied enlargement of federal power. Although some scholars
claim that the powers language was moved to the Tenth Amendment, this clearly
is not the case. The committee left Madison’s proposed Tenth Amendment
unchanged.57 In addition, we know that the Tenth addresses the issue of
unenumerated power. The powers referred to in Madison’s initial draft of the
Ninth involved implied enlargement of those powers that were enumerated. This
language was not moved to the Tenth, it simply disappeared.
Thus, we are left with a clause that, to modern eyes, seems almost inescapably
libertarian. Unlike the Tenth Amendment, there is no mention of the states, only
55

Historians have long been aware of the relationship between Virginia’s 17th proposal
and the Ninth Amendment. See Leslie W. Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth
Amendment, 42 Va. L. Rev. 627, 631 (1956); See Schwartz, The Documentary History
of the Bill of Rights; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note __ at 121
(discussing both Virginia’s and New York’s statements as precursors to the Ninth
Amendment).
56
James Madison (Virginia), John M. Vining (Delaware), Abraham Baldwin (Georgia),
Roger Sherman (Connecticut), Aedanus Burke (South Carolina), Nicholas Gilman (New
Hampshire), George Clymer (Pennsylvania), Egbert Benson (New York), Benjamin
Goodhue (Massachusetts), Elias Boudinot (New Jersey), and George Gale (Maryland).
57
Ultimately, the words “or to the people” would be added to the Tenth Amendment.
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“the people.” Also unlike the Tenth, there is no mention of governmental
powers, only “retained rights.” It is no wonder that Randy Barnett feels
comfortable declaring the Ninth Amendment “Means What it Says,” knowing
that most contemporary readers will assume that the retained rights of the people
must be individual rights. Our endeavor, however, is to recover the public
meaning of the clause circa 1787. As we shall see, “retained rights” in that
period was a far richer concept than what we might expect today. Similarly,
where today we read terms like “the people” as referring to a single national
people, at the time of the Founding the idea of the people was a complicated
subject indeed.
2.

The People’s Retained Rights
“In establishing that [federal] Government the people retained
other governments capable of exercising such necessary and
useful powers as were not to be exercised by the General
Government.”
James Madison58
[T]here is a distinction, between the federal Powers vested in
Congress, and the sovereign Authority belonging to the several
states, which is the Palladium of the private, and personal rights
of the citizen.
Samuel Adams59
All power, jurisdiction, and rights of sovereignty, not granted by
the people by that instrument, or relinquished, are still retained
by them in their several states, and in their respective state
legislatures, according to their forms of government.
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase

The Ninth Amendment speaks of “other rights” retained by the People.
Libertarians like Randy Barnett give a narrow construction to this term and read
it as referring to individual rights and nothing more. Although Barnett at times
suggests these other rights might include majoritarian or collective rights,60 his
overall theory makes such a reading impossible. Barnett claims the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments protect the same set of rights, and one can no more
apply a majoritarian right of local government against the states under the
58

Id.
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Aug. 24, 1789), in Creating the Bill
of Rights, supra note __ at 286.
60
See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says, supra note __ at 16 (“It is
possible that the “other” rights retained by the people were both individual and collective
, in which case the collective rights model identifies a potential application of the Ninth
Amendment beyond the protection of individual liberties.”).
59
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Fourteenth Amendment than one can incorporate the Tenth Amendment. The
federalist reading of the Ninth, however, gives the term “rights” full value: All
rights not delegated away are retained by the People, regardless of the nature of
those rights.
The issue then is determining whether “retained rights” was understood narrowly
to include only individual natural rights, or broadly to include all manner of nondelegated rights. One of the ways to determine the likely public meaning of a
term in the Constitution is to consider how it was used generally at the time of
ratification.
Randy Barnett, for example, has conducted an exhaustive
investigation of uses of the term “to regulate” and the single word “commerce” in
order to identify the public meaning of the broader phrase “Congress shall have
power to regulate commerce among the several states.”61 Similarly, Barnett has
investigated uses of the term “bear arms” and the single word “keep” in order to
discern the likely public meaning of the broader (and complicated) phrase “A
well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”62 For the Ninth
Amendment, a similar approach would consider common usage of the word
“rights” or terms like “retained rights” and “the people” to try and identify how
the ratifiers would have understood the full language of the amendment.
In the case of the Ninth Amendment, however, Barnett declines to engage in his
usual search for common usage of constitutional terms, and instead asserts
without explanation that the broader phrase “other rights retained by the people”
cannot be established by a systematic study of general usage.”63 It may be that
Barnett has not located examples of the exact phrase “other rights retained by the
people.” That, of course, would be no surprise. There also was no common
usage of the exact phrases “regulate commerce among the several states” or “the
right of the people to keep and bear arms.” As Barnett’s own work shows,
however, this does not preclude investigation of particular terms embedded
within the broader text. As Barnett’s own work has shown, an investigation of
the common usage of terms like “retained rights” and “the people” provides
important insights into the likely original public meaning of the Ninth.
The People’s Retained Rights and Popular Sovereignty
Prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution, the term “the people” referred to
the collective sovereign entity of the citizens of a given state. As chronicled by
Gordon Wood, the revolutionary experience created a common belief that the
ultimate source of sovereign power was found in the people themselves, not in

61

See Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev.
101 (2001); Randy Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause 55 Ark. L. Rev. 847 (2003).
62
See Randy Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in
the Militia?, 83 Tex. L. Rev.237 (2004).
63
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 7. See also id. at 23 (“This is why,
when direct evidence of particular usage is unavailable (unlike, for example, with the
Commerce Clause), the formation of clear models is essential as a first step to
adjudicating a dispute over original meaning.”).
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their government.64 In England, the government was (and is65) viewed as the
highest representation of the English people. In the United States, however, the
most recent historical representation of the people had been the colonial
assemblies who continued to meet even when outlawed by the English
government. These assemblies or conventions of the people, came to be viewed
as the highest expression of sovereignty.66 They, and not the government,
represented the people themselves. The people meeting in convention apart from
the ordinary institutions of government had the sovereign right to establish the
state’s fundamental law. In this way, the concept of popular sovereignty--the
very idea of the People--first emerged in reference to the people of a given
state.67
As far as rights are concerned, scholars have long recognized the Founders’
widespread belief in retained individual natural rights.68 However, at the time of
the Founding, there were a variety of rights deemed held by the people in both
their individual and collective capacity. Natural rights, most often associated
with the work of John Locke,69 were divided between those given up in return for
the benefits of a stable government and those unalienable natural rights which
could not legitimately be delegated away.70 Political or civil rights involved
those positive rights arising not from nature itself, but from the nature of
government.71 In addition to individual rights were collective rights, those held
by the people as a collective entity. The most famous of these is announced in
the Declaration of Independence which declared the people’s unalienable right to
alter or abolish their form of government.72 In the period immediately following
the Revolution, all these rights ran against one’s own state government.
The need to form a league with other states, however, called into play a new kind
of retained right. Under the Articles of Confederation, although the Continental
Congress had certain express powers, all powers and rights not delegated were
64

See generally, Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, supra note __. See also,
Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy 32 (2005).
65
See Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, supra note __ at 7-10.
66
Wood, supra note __ at 319-43.
67
See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note __ at 1446.
68
See The Federalist No. 2 at 37 (Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (whenever government
“is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it
with requisite powers”); see also id. No. 43, at 279 (J. Madison) (“the transcendent law of
nature and of nature’s God . . . declares that the safety and happiness of society are the
objects at which all political institution’s aim”). See also Levinson, Constitutional
Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 131, 155 (1988) (“[E]ven
moral skeptics . . . do not deny that the founding generation, as a general matter,
accepted the idea of natural rights.”).
69
See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government §23, at 128 (W. Carpenter ed.
1986)(1st ed. 1690).
70
See The Federalist No. 2, supra note __ at 37 (Jay) (whenever government “is
instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with
requisite powers”).
71
See 1 The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States 454 (Joseph
Gales & William Seaton eds., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).
72
See The Declaration Of Independence (U.S. 1776) ("whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of [unalienable rights], it is the Right of the People to
alter or to abolish it").
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retained by the individual states. As declared by Article II, “[e]ach state retains
its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and
right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States,
in Congress assembled.” This declaration of “states’ rights” did not signal the
abandonment of popular sovereignty and the embrace of some kind of reified
deity called a “state.” The men who drafted the articles embraced the emerging
theory of popular sovereignty.73 Instead, the reference to the retained rights of
the states was a shorthand reference to the retained right of the people in their
respective states to local self-government.74 This is a majoritarian right in that it
preserves the right of local majorities to make decisions regarding local
municipal law.75
When the Constitution was first proposed, the immediate issue was whether it
would erase the sovereign independence of the people in the several states and
consolidate United States citizens into a single undifferentiated mass. However
great the benefits of a national government, the proposed constitution would
never be ratified if it appeared the cost would be such a consolidation.76
Accordingly, advocates of the proposed constitution assured the state
conventions that states would retain a substantial degree of their sovereign
independence. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 32:
“The state governments would clearly retain all the rights of
sovereignty which they before had, and which were not by that
act exclusively delegated to the United States.”77
In 1787, writing in the Cumberland Gazette, Centinel supported the proposed
Constitution because “we retain all our rights which we have not expressly
relinquished to the Union. That section declares that all legislative powers herein
given . . . shall be vested in Congress, etc. The legislative powers which are not
given therein are sure not in Congress; and if not in Congress, are retained by the
73

See Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic. The pre-constitutional
commitment to popular sovereignty in the states can be seen in the decision to call state
constitutional conventions of the people to reenact state Constitutions adopted by the
state legislature. State governments were not “the people themselves” and had no
authority to establish the fundamental law of the state. See id. at 328-343. Even the
Tenth Amendment’s reference to the reserved power of the “states” could be viewed as a
reference to the people in the several states. See Madison’s Report on Virginia
Resolutions, in Writings, supra note __ at 610 (The term states in the Tenth Amendment
(and in the Virginia Resolutions) “means the people composing those political societies,
in their highest sovereign capacity.”).
74
As Madison explained in his Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, references to the
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several States, and secured by their several constitutions.”78 Centinel saw no
difference between “[our] retained rights” and the retained powers of the states.
In the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Patrick Henry referred to the “retained
rights of the people” and the “retained rights of the states” as if they were the
same thing.
If you intend to reserve your unalienable rights, you must have
the most express stipulation. For if implication be allowed, you
are ousted of those rights. If the people do not think necessary to
reserve them, they will be supposed to be given up. How were
the congressional rights defined when the people of America
united by a confederacy to defend their liberties and rights
against the tyrannical attempts of Great Britain? The states were
not then contended with implied reservation. No, Mr. Chairman.
It was expressly declared in our Confederation that every right
was retained by the states respectively, which was not given up
to the Government of the United States. 79
In this one fascinating passage, Patrick Henry speaks of how the retained rights
of the people of America were protected by the Articles’ express declaration that
the respective states retained all non-delegated rights. Virginia proposed a
similar reservation of rights be added to the federal Constitution, as did other
states. Notice how Henry merges the language of individual rights with that of
state autonomy. Retained rights, whatever their specific nature, were collective
in regard to the federal government in that they were left to the control of the
collective people in the states. For example, the North Carolina Convention
declared that “the people have a right to freedom of speech”—an individual
right-- but then went on to declare that “each state in the union shall,
respectively, retain every power, jurisdiction and right” which is not delegated to
the federal government—a collective right.80 Federalist advocates of the
proposed Constitution stressed the same idea—the people retained collective
rights on a state by state basis. According to James Madison in the Federalist
Papers:
“The truth is, that this ultimate redress [political removal at the polls]
may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the federal, than
of the state legislatures, for the plain reason, that as every act of the
former, will be an invasion of the rights of the latter, these will ever be
ready to mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the people, and to
exert their local influence in affecting a change of federal
representatives.”81
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The same language of the retained rights of the collective people occurred
outside the debates over the federal Constitution. In 1791, the same year as the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Pennsylvania legislature passed resolutions
expressing the “sense” of the assembly that the states need not wait for federal
consent to call out the state militia when faced with imminent danger (in this
case, Indian attacks), because states "“retain the right of taking up arms in their
own defense.”82 Similarly, James Madison’s former colleague in the House of
Representatives (and future governor of Georgia), James Jackson wrote a series
of essays in 1795 under the name Sicilius criticizing Yazoo land fraud scandal.83
In his third essay, Jackson considered whether the Georgia legislature had
authority to sell off the western lands. In doing so, he discussed the proper
method of determining whether the people have delegated power to their
governments:
It is a part of some constitutions, and understood in them all, that
all power, not expressly given, is retained by the people. On this
ground it was that Judge Wilson, of the supreme court, whatever
opinion his interest may dictate to him now, strenuously argued
in the convention of Pennsylvania, against the insertion of a bill
of rights, giving the best of reasons for its being left out, that it
was impossible to enumerate all the rights of the people, and that
by the expression of some the others might be supposed to be
delegated. The same arguments prevailed in the House of
Representatives of the United States, on the proposed
amendments to the United States constitution, where Mssrs
Madison, Burke, and others, wished to express some of the
retained rights, and surely the people of Georgia possess those
retained rights, in as great a degree, as those of other states. We
have seen that alienating or mortgaging public lands, requires, in
all governments, an express fundamental law.84
This is yet another example of how the rights “retained by the people” could be
viewed as rights “retained by the states.” Jackson believed that among the
unenumerated retained rights of the people of Georgia was the collective
majoritarian right to “alienate or mortgage” public land. Notice that his
argument about retained rights focuses on the very issue that led to the adoption
82
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of the Ninth Amendment. He does not mention the Ninth by name, but it is clear
that Jackson considers unenumerated retained rights to include federalist
majoritarian rights.85
By stressing the common usage of “retained rights” as referring to the collective
rights of the people in the several states, I do not mean to imply that retained
rights did not also include retained individual rights. The evidence strongly
suggests that it did. As just one example, James Madison expressly referred to an
individual’s freedom of speech as one of the retained natural rights of the
people.86 There are many others.
Once again, however, the adoption of the Constitution complicated the idea of
“retained individual rights.” Under a state constitution, retaining a right meant
restricting state power. Under the federal constitution, however, retaining a right
from the federal government, by definition meant leaving the matter to state
control (assuming the constitution did not also expressly bind the states in the
same matter). For example, although the First Amendment prohibits any law
85
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respecting an establishment of religion, states remained free to establish religion
as they pleased in the decades following the adoption of the Bill of Rights (and
they did87). Likewise, even if the federal government had no power to regulate
seditious libel, according to Madison the states did have such power. Thus,
although Madison claimed that the Alien and Sedition Acts asserted powers
forbidden to the government under the First Amendment, and therefore violated
the Tenth Amendment’s declaration that all non-delegated, non-prohibited power
is reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. In other words, even if one
viewed the “people” of the Ninth Amendment to refer to the undifferentiated
people of the United States, this people retained the right to divide powers and
rights between national and local control. As Madison put it in the quote
presented at the top of this section:
“In establishing that [federal] Government the people retained
other governments capable of exercising such necessary and
useful powers as were not to be exercised by the General
Government.”88
Randy Barnett claims that “because the enumerated rights were individual in
nature, one may reasonably conclude that so too would be the unenumerated
rights retained by the people.”89 To the extent that Barnett is trying to claim that
unenumerated rights did not include collective rights, this is simply incorrect and
easily disproved90 (Barnett himself seems to back away from this absolute claim
in other parts of his article91). But even those aspects of the people’s retained
rights which were individual in nature nevertheless had a dual-aspect under the
Ninth Amendment: They might be personal rights retained from federal control,
but this meant that they were left to local majoritarian (collective) control. This
is how Samuel Adams put it in a letter to Richard Henry Lee in 1789:
I mean my friend, to let you know how deeply I am impressed
with a sense of the Importance of Amendments; that the good
people may clearly see the distinction, for there is a distinction,
between the federal Powers vested in Congress, and the
sovereign Authority belonging to the several states, which is the
Palladium of the private, and personal rights of the citizen.92
Adams here expresses a fundamental principle of federalism in the early
republic: Individual liberty is best protected by preserving local control over
“private and personal rights.”
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Both before and after 1791, it was commonplace to speak of the “retained rights
of the states” and it was just as common to view the “retained rights of the
people” as the equivalent of the retained rights of the people in their respective
state. This was true both of defenders and detractors of the federal Constitution,
and the references occur both within and outside the debates over adopting the
federal Constitution. It was no accident, in other words, that the Bill of Rights
bound only the federal government. Although the first eight amendments did in
fact protect personal rights, the intent and effect of those protections was to leave
control over such matters in the majoritarian hands of the people in the states.
In 1791, of course, the concept of the “people” was neither uniformly understood
nor uncontroversial. After all, the very notion of popular sovereignty was
relatively new, and the adoption of a federal constitution created the conundrum
of divided or dual sovereignty. Worse, the Constitution’s opening declaration of
“We the People” remained critically ambiguous in regard to whether this referred
to “We the (single national) people of the United States, or We the (many)
People of the United States.”93 It was precisely because the term was capable of
these different meanings that the Federalists were compelled to assure the state
conventions that the term did not imply a consolidation of the states and the
people therein into a single mass.94
In later decades, nationalists such as Chief Justice John Marshall and his
admiring associate on the Supreme Court, Joseph Story, claimed that “the
People” were indeed a single united mass of citizens who only happened to live
in several states.95 Both jurists rejected the compact theory of the Constitution
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embraced by theorists like St. George Tucker,96 and presented their own broad
view of federal power. Cases like McCulloch v. Maryland,97 Cohens v.
Virginia,98 and Gibbons v. Ogden99 articulated a nationalist vision of the
Constitution that enraged compact theorists who continued to read “the People”
as a reference to the many People in the several states.100 Not surprisingly, when
the Confederate states seceded from the Union, they adopted language that
removed the ambiguity of the original Constitution.101
But these debates remained for the future. The immediate issue is whether it was
possible that, in 1791, the ratifiers understood the Ninth Amendment as retaining
unenumerated rights to the collective control of the people in the several states.
In light of the common usage of terms like “retained rights” and “the people,” the
answer is clearly yes, it is quite possible. Resolving whether they did requires a
continued investigation of the historical evidence.
3.

The Virginia Response to the Final Draft

The decision to remove Madison’s language addressing the implied enlargement
of federal power may have streamlined the Ninth, but it resulted in a text unlike
any suggested by the state ratifying conventions. In theory, the clause limited
federal power but did so only by implication, not express declaration.
Nevertheless, the language satisfied most of the state legislative assemblies who
quickly ratified the Ninth along with most of the other proposed amendments. In
States.'”); Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution at 400 (1833) (citing the
nationalist depictions of the people in Martin and McCulloch).
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Virginia, however, the changed language of the Ninth caused such concern that it
delayed that state’s ratification of the Bill of Rights for two years.
Although anti-federalist sentiment ran high in Virginia, a majority of the state
convention had ratified the Constitution on the understanding that amendments
limiting the scope of federal power would be forthcoming. Adding a Bill of
Rights not only would deliver on a promise Madison made to the State
convention, it also would rob the anti-federalists of their cause celebre’ and
deflate the calls for a second constitutional convention.102 Thus, it was a matter
of immediate concern to Madison when he heard that efforts to ratify the Bill of
Rights in Virginia had been brought to a halt by a “friend of the Constitution,”
Edmund Randolph, due to his concerns about Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
a. The Concerns of Edmund Randolph
As a member of the Philadelphia Convention, Edmund Randolph had refused to
sign the proposed Constitution. He did not oppose the idea of a national
government, but believed that provisions like the Necessary and Proper Clause
opened the door to unconstrained federal power. According to Randolph
My objection is, that the [Necessary and Proper Clause] is
ambiguous, and that that ambiguity may injure the states. My
fear is, that it will, by gradual accessions, gather to a dangerous
length. This is my apprehension, and I disdain to disown it.103
Despite his doubts, Randolph nevertheless supported the Constitution trusting
that federal power could be constrained through the adoption of appropriate
amendments. As Madison wrote to Jefferson in December of 1787, men like
Edmund Randolph “do not object to the substance of the Governt. but contend
for a few additional guards in favor of the rights of the states and of the
people.”104 It soon would be clear that Randolph’s concerns involved the
“people” of the several states.
Madison helped to secure Virginia’s ratification by assuring doubters like
Edmund Randolph that he would support a Bill of Rights.105 Both Madison and
Randolph had helped draft the Virginia convention’s proposed amendments,
including the Seventeenth proposal that Madison substantially copied in his
original draft of the Ninth Amendment. Madison’s proposed amendments were
published in local newspapers, and he sent a copy directly to Edmund
Randolph.106 No one in Virginia, including Randolph, voiced any complaint
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about Madison’s original draft of proposed amendments. Indeed, upon receiving
Madison’s proposals, Randolph wrote “The amendments proposed by you, are
much approved by the strong foederalists here and at the metropolis.”107
Towards the end of the summer of 1789, Congress submitted to the states the
final form of twelve proposed amendments. The altered language of the final
draft of the Ninth (eleventh on a list of twelve proposed amendments) now
caused Randolph grave concern. As reported by a member of the Virginia
House, Hardin Burnley:
On the two last [the Ninth and Tenth Amendments] a debate of
some length took place, which ended in rejection. Mr. E.
Randolph who advocated all the other[] [amendments] stood in
this contest in the front of opposition. His principal objection
was pointed against the word retained in the eleventh proposed
amendment, and his argument if I understood it was applied in
this manner, that as the rights declared in the first ten of the
proposed amendments were not all that a free people would
require the exercise of; and that as there was no criterion by
which it could be determined whither any other particular right
was retained or not, it would be more safe, & more consistent
with the spirit of the 1st & 17th amendments proposed by
Virginia, that this reservation against constructive power, should
operate rather as a provision against extending the powers of
Congress by their own authority, than as a protection to rights
reducable to no definitive certainty.108
According to Burnley, Randolph understood the Ninth was meant to be a
“reservation against constructive power” (as opposed to a guardian of natural
rights). As such, it would have been more consistent with the “spirit” of
Virginia’s”1st and 17th” proposed amendments to use language expressly
addressing the issue of extended federal power. In his letters to George
Washington, Edmund Randolph elaborated on his objections. Although he did
not think that the Tenth Amendment was particularly troublesome, Randolph
nevertheless viewed the Tenth by itself to be an inadequate limitation on federal
power:
The [Tenth] amendment does not appear to me to have any real
effect, unless it be to excite a dispute between the United States,
and every particular state, as to what is delegated. It accords
pretty nearly with what our convention proposed; but being once
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adopted, it may produce new matter for the cavils of the
designing.109
Randolph’s more serious concerns involved the Ninth. The final draft of that
provision, Randolph complained to Washington, “is exceptionable to me, in
giving a handle to say, that congress have endeavoured to administer an opiate,
by an alteration, which is merely plausible.”110 Instead of this merely “plausible
alteration,” Randolph preferred “a provision against extending the powers of
Congress.” Such an expressly limitation on the implied enlargement of federal
power would be “more safe, & more consistent with the spirit of [Virginia’s] 1st
and 17th amendments.”111
Randolph was deeply concerned about the federal government stretching its
powers to the injury of the states. This is why he originally refused to sign the
proposed Constitution. The 1st and 17th proposals of the Virginia convention
sought to avoid such injury and did so by directly addressing the issue of federal
power. Although Madison’s original draft of the Ninth expressly addressed this
concern, the final draft did not. To Edmund Randolph, this was a problem
precisely because it might plausibly be read as limiting federal power. This
plausibility might induce states to ratify the Ninth even though it was not at all
clear that the amendment would effectively preserve state autonomy. Thus, this
version of the Ninth would act as an “opiate” and dampen the calls for a more
effective guardian of state rights. Accordingly, Randolph advised rejecting both
the proposed the Ninth and Tenth in order to maintain pressure on Congress to
produce a more “federalist” amendment. As he wrote to Washington:
I confess I see no propriety in adopting [the 9th and 10th]. But I
trust that the refusal to ratify will open the road to such an
expression of foederalism, as will efface the violence of the last
year, and the intemperance of the enclosed letter, printed by the
enemies to the constitution.”112
In sum, Randolph believed the Ninth was meant to prevent the implied
enlargement of federal power to the injury of the states. This was the purpose of
Virginia’s 1st and 17th proposed amendments and this had been expressly stated
in Madison’s original drafts of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The final draft
of the Tenth was fine, but inadequate—an additional rule limiting the
construction of enumerated federal power was required. The final draft of the
Ninth plausibly accomplished this goal, but it would have been better to use the
clearer language of Virginia’s original proposals. So concerned was Randolph
109. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 6, 1789), in 5
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about the final draft, he was willing to temporarily hold up ratification of the Bill
in the hopes of obtaining a clearer, more “foederal” draft of the Ninth
Amendment.
b. The Letters of Hardin Burnley and James Madison
When Madison heard about Randolph’s actions in the Virginia House, he was
mystified. Although the final language of the Ninth had been altered, it
continued to advance the principles as Virginia’s Seventeenth. As Madison
immediately reported to George Washington,
The difficulty started [against] the amendments is really unlucky,
and the more to be regretted as it springs from a friend to the
Constitution. It is a still greater cause of regret, if the distinction
be, as it appears to me, altogether fanciful. If a line can be
drawn between the powers granted and the rights retained, it
would seem to be the same thing whether the latter be secured by
declaring that they shall not be abridged, or that the former shall
not be extended.113
Randolph thought the Ninth was insufficiently “federalist” because it used the
language of rights instead of the language of limited power (as had Virginia’s
17th). Madison, however, believed that Randolph’s distinction between rights
and powers was “fanciful.” If the goal is to establish a line between delegated
power and retained rights, then limiting power or retaining rights amount to the
same thing. Accordingly, Randolph was wrong to complain about the altered
language of the Ninth—the final draft remained just as “federalist” as the
original.
Randy Barnett believes that Madison’s letter to Washington exhibits “Madison’s
typically complex phraseology,”114 and actually refers to two different means of
accomplishing the single end of preserving individual natural rights. Madison’s
letter, however, is neither complex nor has it anything to do with preserving
individual natural rights. Barnett misses this point by failing to consider the
subject of Madison’s letter—the concerns of Edmund Randolph. Those concerns
were about state rights and not retained individual natural rights. Madison
believed Randolph’s concerns were “fanciful” because he read the final language
of the Ninth as meeting Randolph’s federalism-based concerns. Hardin Burnley
agreed with Madison about the Ninth’s protection of state rights and said so in a
letter (which Madison passed on to Washington) that makes this point as clear as
is humanly possible:
But others among whom I am one see not the force of
[Randolph’s] distinction, for by preventing an extension of
113. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 5
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power in that body from which danger is apprehended safety will
be insured if its powers are not too extensive already, & so by
protecting the rights of the people & of the States, an improper
extension of power will be prevented & safety made equally
certain.115
Here Burnley—a ratifier in the Virginia Assembly-- expressly describes the
Ninth Amendment as protecting the rights of the states. Indeed, if Madison and
Burnley were not talking about how the Ninth guards state autonomy, then their
entire exchange becomes nonsensical (it would mean, for one thing, that
Randolph was right to be concerned). Randy Barnett nevertheless maintains that
Madison was speaking about individual rights and he dismisses Burnley’s
comment about state rights because “Burnley himself clearly distinguishes
between “the people” and “the states” and the actual words of the Ninth
Amendment refer only to the former."116 This, of course, begs the very question
under discussion-- whether the ratifiers understood the retained rights of the
Ninth to include “state rights.” Burnley obviously thought it did.
Most significantly, Barnett’s dismissive treatment of Burnley’s statement misses
the point of Madison’s and Burnley’s letters: Both men believed that Randolph
had wrongly criticized the Ninth as inadequately “federalist.” Preserving the
retained rights of the people would necessarily constrain federal power and
adequately protect the retained rights of the people and the states.117 This is the
only way to make sense of both Burnley’s and Madison’s response to Randolph’s
concerns. Keeping the letter’s subject in view has the happy effect of rendering
Madison’s prose quite clear: preventing an extension of power and retaining
rights amount to the same thing.118
d. The Virginia Senate Report
Given that they were in constant touch throughout this period, we can assume
that Madison’s assurances regarding the Ninth Amendment were promptly
communicated to Randolph.119 In any event, we know that Randolph quickly
abandoned his opposition to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.120 Unfortunately,
the damage was done. Anti-federalists managed to exploit the delay and put off a

115. Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5 Documentary
History, supra note__, at 219.
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Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 55.
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Tenth Amendment makes the same distinction.
118
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See James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 7, 1787), in 10 The Papers of James
Madison, supra note __ at 185; James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 21, 1787), id.
at 199; James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Nov. 18, 1787), in id. at 252.
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Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 15, 1789), in 5
Documentary History, supra note__, at 225.
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final vote on ratifying the Bill of Rights.121 Although the House voted in support
of the Amendments, ratification ran into trouble in the anti-federlaist dominated
Senate where Randolph’s original concerns were “revived.”122 The Senate
majority resisted ratification and produced a Report “reviving” Randolph’s
concerns and added a few of their own.123 In brief, the Senate amplified
Randolph’s concerns and expanded them to include criticism of the First, Sixth,
Ninth and Tenth Amendments.124
The complaints of the Senate majority have to be taken with more than a grain of
salt: The anti-federalists wanted to derail ratification of the Bill of Rights in order
to maintain the pressure for a second constitutional convention.125 They had
every reason to exaggerate their concerns about the proposed amendments.126
Nevertheless, even the exaggerated claims and concerns of the Virginia Senate
majority can shed some light on the original meaning (or ambiguity) of the Ninth
Amendment.
In its Report, the Virginia Senate objected that the Ninth Amendment had not
been “asked for by Virginia or any other State,” and that it “appears to us highly
exceptionable.”127
If the 11th Article [the Ninth Amendment] is meant to guard
against the extension of the powers of Congress by implication,
it is greatly defective, and does by no means comprehend the
idea expressed in the 17th article of amendments proposed by
Virginia; and as it respects personal rights, might be dangerous,
because, should the rights of the people be invaded or called in
question, they might be required to shew by the constitution
what rights they have retained; and such as could not from that
121
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instrument be proved to be retained by them, they might be
denied to possess. Of this there is ground to be apprehensive,
when Congress are already seen denying certain rights of the
people, heretofore deemed clear and unquestionable.128
The Report seems to suggest that there are two possible readings of the Ninth. If
this was an attempt to address the concerns Virginia’s 17th proposal, it was
“greatly defective.” If, on the other hand, this was an attempt to secure the
people’s retained rights, then it was ineffective (and might be “dangerous”).
Randy Barnett reads these alternate complaints and concludes that the Senate
Report establishes that the final version of the Ninth “represents a change in
meaning from the protection of state powers to the protection of ‘personal
rights.’” The Report, however, actually presents two possible meanings: One in
line with the state proposals but defective, the other also in line with the state
concerns but ineffective.129
Taking the latter first, the Senate majority complains that, if this was an attempt
to secure retained personal rights, then it was ineffective because the plaintiff in
such a case would be unable to establish the existence of such a right from the
text of the Constitution.130 As explained above, even if the Senate is only
referring to individual natural rights (and there is no reason to think that the antifederalist Senate would be concerned solely with retained individual natural
rights), then these rights would be retained to the people of the individual states.
If Barnett is trying to argue the anti-federalist dominated Senate understood
retained rights in a manner that would not leave all such rights under state
control, he simply does not understand anti-federalism.

128. Id. at 63–64. The Senate’s reported objections to the twelfth were as follows:
We conceive that the 12th article would come up to the 1st article of
the Virginia amendments, were it not for the words “or to the people.”
It is not declared to be the people of the respective States; but the
expression applies to the people generally as citizens of the United
States, and leaves it doubtful what powers are reserved to the State
Legislatures. Unrestrained by the constitution or these amendments,
Congress might, as the supreme rulers of the people, assume those
powers which properly belong to the respective States, and thus
gradually effect an entire consolidation.
Id. at 64. This exaggerated concern about the Tenth Amendment does not appear to have
been shared by any one other than those seeking to force a second constitutional
convention. See infra note __ and accompanying text..
129
Even if meant to protect the “retained rights of the people,” this could include the
people’s retained right to local self-government.
130
This probably echoes a concern originally voiced by Randolph in the House.
Burnley’s letter to Madison collapses this argument with Randolph’s second and
independent complaint that the best approach to limiting power is to use the language of
Virginia’s Seventeenth proposal. Even Burnley wasn’t sure he had adequately presented
Randolph’s concerns. See See Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5
Documentary History, supra note __ at 219 (Burnley indicating that he may not have
understood the precise nature of Randolph’s objection).
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But even if one concedes (which I do not) that the Senates’ second concern is a
reference only to retained individual rights, the Senate majority expressly notes
that this is only one of two possible meanings. The first possible meaning
suggested by the Senate is an attempt to address the same concerns as those
addressed by Virginia’s 17th proposal. If this was the intended meaning of the
Ninth, says the Senate, then it fails to adequately address those particular
concerns.
The Senate’s language here is an exaggerated restatement of Randolph’s
preference for the language of Virginia’s 17th (the final version of the Ninth to
Randolph “by no means comprehend the idea expressed in the 17th article of
amendments proposed by Virginia”). The entire Senate Report, in fact, was
given to exaggeration. Among other things, the Report argued that the proposed
Free Exercise Clause “does not prohibit the rights of conscience from being
violated or infringed,” and the Establishment Clause allows Congress “to levy
taxes, to any amount, for the support of religion or its preachers; and any
particular denomination of Christians might be so favored and supported by the
General government, as to give it a decided advantage over others.”131 Finally,
the Report claimed that Free Speech and Press Clauses did not “declare and
assert the right of the people to speak and publish their sentiments.”132 It is
difficult to take these criticisms seriously—much less at face value. According
to Leonard Levy, the Senate Report “grossly misrepresented” the First
Amendment, and Madison himself believed that the Senate had overplayed its
hand and its Report would backfire.133 In fact, the Virginia anti-federalist effort
to derail the Bill of Rights ultimately failed.
On the other hand, despite the obviously exaggerated rhetoric, the Senate Report
does represent possible readings of the Ninth Amendment. Even if the Senate
had an incentive to exaggerate, they did not intend their arguments to stray so far
from reason as to discredit their position (though this may have happened
anyway). Therefore, I agree with Professor Barnett that the complaints of the
Senate majority should be granted at least some plausibility, given their goal of
winning over a sufficient number of moderates to derail ratification of the Bill of
Rights. For example, the Senate correctly pointed out that the final language of
the Ninth did not track the language of any proposal submitted by the state
conventions. This left the Senate in the position of guessing at the purpose of the
altered language. The fact that the Senate could not decide on the precise object
of the Ninth Amendment raises the possibility that that the final version of the
Ninth was hopelessly ambiguous. It might be an attempt to preserve the
autonomy of the states but, then again, it might not. Given the reaction of the
131
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Senate majority, perhaps the final language of the Ninth was so unclear as to
render the Clause without any commonly accepted public meaning.
However, before abandoning the originalist effort altogether, some facts must be
kept in mind. To begin with, no other state legislature complained about the final
language of the Ninth. All of these states knew that Madison’s original version
of the Ninth expressly limited federal power (his proposals had been widely
published in newspapers across the country). Only in Virginia were concerns
raised about the final version of the Ninth. Also, we know that Virginians like
Madison and Burnley believed that the final version guarded the same principles
as those expressed in Virginia’s seventeenth (thus the unreasonableness of
Randolph’s complaint). If others shared this reading of the Ninth, this explains
the general lack of concern by moderates and proponents of the Bill. We also
know that despite his concerns, Randolph believed the federalist reading was a
“plausible” one and he soon abandoned his opposition. Finally, we know that the
Senate majority had every reason to exaggerate concerns about the Ninth
Amendment and we know that their efforts to prevent ratification failed.
In sum, there is no good reason to make one part of the Senate Report’s
complaint about the Ninth the common public understanding of the Ninth
Amendment. In fact, there is good historical reason not to do so. Nevertheless,
given that moderates like Edmund Randolph were initially thrown by the final
language of the Ninth, one cannot completely dismiss their complaint. Even if
other states were satisfied with the language of the Ninth, Virginia remained
temporarily undecided about the Ninth Amendment and the rest of the Bill of
Rights. The ambiguous nature of the Ninth needed to be addressed, if only to
satisfy Virginia moderates.
. . . enter James Madison.
4.

Madison’s Speech on the Bank of the United States

Perhaps the most important source of historical evidence regarding the public
understanding of the Ninth Amendment is Madison’s speech opposing the First
Bank of the United States. Delivered by the person who drafted the Ninth
Amendment, the speech includes both an explanation and an application of the
Ninth, and it was delivered while Virginia remained undecided about the Ninth
Amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights. To put the speech in perspective,
no other provision in the Bill of Rights received anything near this kind of public
discussion and application at the very time its ratification was under
consideration.
One of the most important aspects of Madison’s speech on the Bank of the
United States is that it establishes Madison’s view that the Ninth was meant to
limit unduly broad interpretations of federal power. On this point, Randy Barnett
and I agree. Madison understood the Ninth as more than a mere passive
statement of principle. He read the clause as a judicially enforceable rule of
construction—an active constraint on federal power. Where Barnett and I
disagree involves whether Madison’s use of the Ninth involved the protection of
an individual natural right or the preservation of state autonomy. Elsewhere, I
have argued in detail that Madison used the Ninth in defense of state rights and
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did so in a manner that recapitulates the entire history of the Amendment, from
its roots in the state conventions to its final placement along side, and in tandem
with, the Tenth Amendment.134 What follows is more of a summary of that
argument than a complete analysis of the speech, and I will concentrate on those
aspects that are particularly relevant to my disagreement with Randy Barnett.
Madison delivered his speech early in 1791 while the Bill of Rights remained
pending in Virginia. The subject involved one of the first debates over the
interpretation of federal power, in this case whether the enumerated powers of
Congress included the power to incorporate a national bank. Nationalists like
Alexander Hamilton argued for a broad reading of federal power, in particular
the Necessary and Proper Clause.135 James Madison, however, believed such
broad readings of federal power betrayed the assurances Federalists made to the
state conventions in their attempt to win support for the Constitution.
Madison’s major argument was delivered in a speech before the House of
Representatives on February 2, 1791.136 After some brief remarks regarding the
merits of incorporating a bank, Madison presented an extended argument
regarding the constitutionality of the Bank. He begins this section by laying out
the proper rules of constitutional interpretation:
[1] An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the
government cannot be just. . . .
[2] In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the
instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper
guide.
[3] Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable
evidence of the meaning of the parties.
[4] In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the
degree of its incidentality to an express authority, is to be
regarded, but the degree of its importance also; since on this will
depend the probability or improbability of its being left to
construction.137
These rules are developed and applied in the main body of Madison’s speech. As
Madison will make clear in the next section of his remarks, the “characteristic of
government” to be preserved under Rule [1] involved the reserved autonomy of
the states. The “parties” referenced in Rule [2], whose understanding are a
proper guide to constitutional interpretation, are the state ratifying conventions.
134
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Promises made to those conventions about the limited nature of federal power are
the “expositions” of Rule [3]. Finally, Rule [4] is an interpretive rule Madison
derives from the Constitution itself: the more important the power, the more
likely the parties would have expressly listed it in the text rather than leave such
an important matter to implication.
After laying out the appropriate approach to interpreting the Constitution,
Madison then addressed the specific arguments in support of congressional
power. Attempts to locate the power to incorporate a bank in the General
Welfare Clause “would render nugatory the enumeration of particular powers;
would supercede all the powers reserved to the state governments.”138 In
response to those who argued that Congress could act for the “general welfare”
so long as it did not interfere with the powers of the States, Madison argued that
chartering a bank “would directly interfere with the rights of the States to
prohibit as well as to establish banks.”139
Addressing the Necessary and Proper Clause, Madison argued that that deriving
the power to charter a bank as necessary and proper to borrowing money opened
the door to an unlimited list of “implied powers” and required a “latitude of
interpretation . . .condemned by the rule furnished by the Constitution itself.140
Madison believed that the manner in which powers were enumerated in the
Constitution, established an implicit “rule” requiring the express enumeration of
all “great and important powers.”141 Declaring that “it cannot be denied that the
power proposed to be exercised is an important power,”142 Madison then listed a
number of significant aspects of the Bank Charter, including the fact that the Bill
“gives a power to purchase and hold lands” and that “it involves a monopoly,
which affects the equal rights of every citizen.”143 To Madison, these effects
established that the power to charter a bank was a “great and important power”
which required express enumeration.144

138. Gazette of The United States (Philadelphia), Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14
Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, supra note__, at 369.
139. Id. at 370.
140. Id. at 371–72.
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of the United States (Philadelphia), Apr. 20, 1791, reprinted in 14 Documentary History
of the First Federal Congress, supra___, at 473 (reporting Madison’s statements during
the debates over the Bank Bill that “[t]he power of granting Charters, he observed, is a
great and important power, and ought not to be exercised, without we find ourselves
expressly authorized to grant them”).
142. Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), FEB. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14
Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, supra___, at 373.
143. Id.
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In the final section of his speech, Madison addressed the original understanding
of federal power represented to the conventions that ratified the document. In
one of the first constitutional arguments based on original understanding,
Madison reminded the House that the original objection to a Bill of Rights had
been due to fear that this would “extend[]” federal power “by remote
implications.”145 State conventions had been assured that the Necessary and
Proper Clause would not be interpreted to give “additional powers to those
enumerated.”146 Madison “read sundry passages from the debates” of the state
conventions in which “the constitution had been vindicated by its principal
advocates, against a dangerous latitude of its powers, charged on it by its
opponents.”147 These state conventions had agreed to ratify the Constitution only
on the condition that certain explanatory amendments be added which made
express what the Federalists claimed were principles already implicit in the
structure of the Constitution. Madison reminded his audience of the proposals
submitted by the state conventions seeking to guard against the constructive
extension of federal power: “The explanatory declarations and amendments
accompanying the ratifications of the several states formed a striking evidence,
wearing the same complexion. He referred those who might doubt on the
subject, to the several acts of ratification.”148
Madison then arrives at the argument that he believes concludes the issue. The
proper rule of interpretation--implied in the structure of the Constitution,
represented by the Federalists to the state conventions, and demanded to be made
express by those same conventions--found textual expression in the proposed
Ninth and Tenth Amendments:
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves,
at least, would be good authority with them [the state proposals];
all these renunciations of power proceeded on a rule of
construction, excluding the latitude now contended for. These
explanations were the more to be respected, as they had not only
been proposed by Congress, but ratified by nearly three-fourths
of the states.149 He read several of the articles proposed,
remarking particularly on the 11th. and 12th [the 9th and 10th] the
former, as guarding against a latitude of interpretation—the
latter, as excluding every source of power not within the
constitution itself.150

to be included in it, and not being included could never have been rightfully exercised.”
Id.
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Madison then sums up his argument in a manner that establishes, without any
further question, that Madison read the Ninth as preserving the autonomy of the
states:
In fine, if the power were in the constitution, the immediate
exercise of it cannot be essential—if not there, the exercise of it
involves the guilt of usurpation, and establishes a precedent of
interpretation, levelling all the barriers which limit the powers of
the general government, and protect those of the state
governments.151
Madison’s speech is an extended dissertation on the proper rules of constitutional
interpretation—and how that interpretation ought to be informed by the
expectations of the state conventions. Justifying the Bank required an unduly
broad reading of federal power. The state conventions had been assured there
would be no “latitudinary” readings of federal power; they had ratified the
Constitution with the express understanding that would be the case, and they
secured amendments insuring this would not be the case. The Ninth amendment
expressly prohibited this latitude of interpretation and thus preserved the
expected degree of state autonomy. As Madison’s colleague, Nathaniel Niles
remarked a few months later, “Congress have very extensive powers, but they are
not at liberty to infringe on certain rights retained by the states . . .”152
Randy Barnett’s Interpretation of Madison’s Speech
Despite Madison’s repeated references to state rights and powers, and his
summation linking the Ninth Amendment to the concerns of the state
conventions, Randy Barnett nevertheless argues that Madison’s speech
establishes that “Madison viewed the Ninth Amendment as providing authority
for a rule against a loose construction of [federal] powers—especially the
Necessary and Proper Clause—when legislation affected the rights retained by
the people.”153 To Barnett, the Bank speech supports his conclusion “that the
unenumerated individual rights retained by the people provide the same sort of
check on latitudinarian constructions of federal power as do the enumerated
rights.”154 The problem with this reading of Madison’s speech is that Madison
nowhere claims that the Bank Bill violates “unenumerated individual rights.”
Indeed, Madison never even mentions the “rights retained by the people.”
Instead, Madison repeatedly asserts that the Bill violates states rights. Barnett’s
claim to the contrary is based on a single reference by Madison to a monopoly’s
effect on “the equal rights of every citizen.”
I want to do full justice to Barnett’s argument because of his repeated reliance on
it in later works and the critical role it plays in his overall theory of a libertarian
151. Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), FEB. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14
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152
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Ninth Amendment: This is Barnett’s only piece of historical evidence in which
(he believes) the Ninth is described as a libertarian guardian of individual
rights.155 Barnett’s argument is not presented in his recent article, but can be
found in his earlier work.156 Here it is in full:
In evaluating whether the necessary and proper clause justified
the claimed power to create a national bank, Madison contrasted
the requirement of necessity with that of mere convenience or
expediency. “But the proposed bank,” he said:
“could not even be called necessary to the Government;
at most it could be but convenient. Its uses to the
Government could be supplied by keeping the taxes a
little in advance; by loans from individuals; by the other
Banks, over which the Government would have equal
command; nay greater, as it might grant or refuse to
these the privilege (a free and irrevocable gift to the
proposed Bank) of using their notes in the Federal
revenues.”
Notice that Madison was not simply making what would now be
called a “policy” choice. Earlier in his address to the House,
Madison did address the policy issues raised by the proposal
when he “began with a general review of the advantages and
disadvantages of Banks.” However, ‘[I]n making these remarks
on the merits of the bill, he had reserved to himself the right to
deny the authority of Congress to pass it.” Rather, in the passage
I quoted, Madison is making the constitutional argument that
these other means of accomplishing an enumerated objector end
are superior precisely because they did not entail the violation of
the rights retained by the people and are therefore to be preferred
in principle. In particular, these measures do not involve the
grant of a monopoly, “which,” in Madison’s words,” affects the
equal rights of every citizen.”157
This is a clearly erroneous reading of Madison’s speech. Madison’s reference to
equal rights has nothing to do with his statement regarding the Bank’s
“necessity.” Nor is Madison making a point about retained individual rights.
Barnett has collapsed two entirely separate arguments and reversed the order in
which they appear. Just to let Madison’s own words be our guide, here is his
reference to “equal rights” in context:
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“It cannot be denied that the power proposed to be exercised is
an important power. . . .
In the power to make bye laws, the bill delegated a sort of
legislative power, which is unquestionably an act of a high and
important nature. . . .
It takes from our successors, who have equal rights with
ourselves, and with the aid of experience will be more capable of
deciding on the subject, an opportunity of exercising that right,
for an immoderate term. . . .
It involves a monopoly, which affects the equal rights of every
citizen.
It leads to a penal regulation, perhaps capital punishments, one
of the most solemn acts of sovereign authority.
From this view of the power of incorporation exercised in the
bill, it could never be deemed an accessory or subaltern power,
to be deduced by implication, as a means of executing another
power; it was in its nature a distinct, an independent and
substantive prerogative, which not being enumerated in the
constitution could never have been meant to be included in it,
and not being included could never be rightfully exercised.”158
Madison’s argument about the Bank’s effect on “equal rights” was part of a
larger argument regarding the importance of the power at issue. The Bank’s
effect on equal rights was one among a number of listed “effects” that marked it
as an important power requiring enumeration.
Madison next argues that enumeration was required even if the power was
believed “necessary” to the proper operation of the national government.
Madison points out that people had not always appreciated the difference
“between a power necessary and proper for the Government or Union, and a
power necessary and proper for executing the enumerated powers.”159 Just
because a power was deemed “necessary” did not bring it within reach of the
“necessary and proper clause.” For example, “[h]ad the power of making
treaties, for example, been omitted, however necessary it might have been, the
defect could only have been lamented, supplied by an amendment to the
Constitution.”160 It is only at this point that Madison goes further and claims
“[b]ut the proposed Bank could not even be called necessary to the
Government,” and he then lists the various alternate means available to Congress
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quoted by Randy Barnett.161 At this point, Madison is making a new and separate
argument that there also is no necessity of adding the power of chartering Banks
to the Constitution.
I addressed this passage and Professor Barnett’s error in a previous article.162 In
his recent response, Barnett addresses a secondary argument based on Madison’s
draft veto, and objects to my placing the “equal rights” argument in Madison’s
merits-based objections instead of placing it in his constitutional objections.163 I
now think Barnett is right—the equal rights argument is within Madison’s
section on constitutional objections. However, Barnett never addresses my
primary criticism of his claim about Madison’s reference to equal rights. Yes, it
was a constitutional argument, but one that had nothing to do with the Bank Bill
violating unenumerated individual rights, much less individual natural rights.
There is nothing about individual rights in Madison’s summation, nor is there
any mention of individual rights in his draft veto of the Bank bill.164 What we do
find, on the other hand, are repeated express claims that the Bill violates the
retained rights of the states.165
Faced with Madison’s references expressly linking the Ninth to state rights,
Barnett makes the same move as he did when faced with Hardin Burnley’s
express statement that the Ninth protected states rights, he dismisses the
references as “mistakes”:
“[W]e cannot make too much of Madison’s two uses of the word
“rights” when referring to the powers of the states. The
Constitution is far more scrupulous about using the terms
“rights” only when speaking of the people or citizens or persons,
and “powers” when speaking of either the government or the
people. In everyday discourse, speakers were not so punctilious.
Overwhelmingly, however, in his speech Madison refers to the
powers of states, rather than to their rights.”
This is a surprising statement coming from someone supposedly committed to
the search for original meaning. Because the text is not self-explanatory,
originalists search for original meaning in public debates and common
contemporary usages of phrases and terms. Put another way, originalists use
“everyday discourse” to help them understand a text; they do not use assumed
meanings of the text to dismiss common contemporary usage. Barnett’s
approach instead flips the originalist inquiry on its head and judges common
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59.
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usage according to his assumed interpretation of the text. In the end, Barnett
simply begs the question when he assumes that Madison must have been
referring to state powers when he (repeatedly) referred to state rights. We cannot
know this without consulting common usage—the very evidence Barnet
dismisses.
Madison’s complaints about the Bank Bill violating state rights were not unique.
Newspapers echoed Madison’s concern that the proposed bank violated the
retained rights of the states. According to the New York based The Daily
Advertiser:
The arguments against establishing the proposed National Bank
acquire new strength by every investigation. It is no less to be
deprecated as unconstitutional, than as founded on an improper
basis. If power had been given to Congress to incorporate great
trading companies, our boasted liberty had been at an end. . . .
Within the states in which they were established, they might
soon have created powers injurious to its sovereignty, and
destructive of its freedom. But we must be on our guard how we
suffer the doctrine of political expediency or necessity, or
plausible constructions of the constitution, to be pleaded against
manifestly retained rights, in the separate states.166
In a state that only a few months earlier had ratified the Ninth Amendment, these
newspaper editors speak of constitutional constructions that violate retained
rights “in the separate states.” Their argument in regard to the Bank echoes
Madison’s view that the charter required an unduly broad construction of federal
power--one that violated the retained rights of the states. Decades later,
opponents to a renewed Bank charter revived Madison’s arguments against the
Bank (his entire speech was republished in newspapers) and opponents once
again stressed the need to enumerate a great and important power in order to
guard the retained autonomy of the states.167 All of these arguments use the
language of retained rights in the service of state sovereignty.
Although I disagree with Barnett’s reading of Madison’s speech, I do not deny
that the Ninth protects individual natural rights, nor do I insist that the Bank
threatened only state rights and not individual rights. Indeed, some critics
contended that monopolies threatened both.168 But this merely illustrates how the
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Although Madison failed to prevent the chartering of the First Bank of the United
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Madison’s 1791 speech. See The Richmond Enquirer (Jan. 4, 1810), at 4. For use of the
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federalist Ninth protects all retained rights, natural and positive, individual and
collective, personal and “state.” Barnett’s error is not his identifying natural
rights as an important subject to the Founders, it is his attempt to deny Madison’s
use of the Ninth as guarding state majoritarian rights and his insistence that
protecting individual rights was the “single goal” of the Clause. The evidence
suggests that this was not even the primary goal.
Most critically, Randy Barnett never addresses the penultimate section of
Madison’s speech in which he expressly links the Ninth to the concerns of the
state conventions. Here, Madison recapitulates the entire history of the Ninth
Amendment, from the promises made to the state conventions, to the state
declarations and proposals, to the final draft that, according to Madison,
prevented a “latitude of interpretation.”169 Madison then declares in summation
that all of his arguments have established how violating this rule of construction
violates the autonomy of the states. This is the most elaborate discussion of the
roots and purposes of the Ninth Amendment to be found in the historical record,
and it establishes that the author drafted the Ninth in response to the concerns
and demands of the state conventions. In all of his work on the Ninth
Amendment, however, Randy Barnett never discusses Madison’s argument in
these critical paragraphs or their implications regarding Madison’s (or the
public’s) understanding of the Ninth.170
IV. Post-Adoption Commentary
I have devoted over 100 pages in a single law review article to post-adoption
commentary on the Ninth Amendment.171 For the purposes of this article,
however, it can be easily summarized: The scholarly and judicial commentary
regarding the Ninth Amendment is extensive and uniformly federalist. Every
scholar or judge (state or federal) prior to the Progressive era who discussed or
applied the Ninth viewed it as a federalist provision protecting the reserved
autonomy of the states. I have found scattered attempts by lawyers to use an
individual rights reading of the Ninth in defense of their client. This is not
surprising given that the Ninth protected both individual and collective rights.
governments.”). See also James Jackson’s Sicilius essays on the Yazoo scandal, infra
note __ and accompanying text (deriding the scandal as involving a monopoly and
injuring both individual equal rights and the collective retained rights of the people of
Georgia) (at 50).
169
“The defense against the charge founded on the want of a bill of rights, presupposed,
he said, that the powers not given were retained; and that those given were not to be
extended by remote implications . . . The explanations in the state conventions all turned
on the same fundamental principle. .. . The explanatory declarations and amendments
accompanying the ratifications of the several states formed a striking evidence, wearing
the same complexion. . . .The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress
themselves, at least, would be good authority with them; all these renunciations of power
proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude now contended for.”
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demands of the state conventions.
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What is surprising is how exceedingly rare are these exceptions to the general
rule. There are literally hundreds of cases and commentaries linking the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments as twin guardians of federalism. Randy Barnett accuses
me of attempting to use these later references as evidence of the original meaning
of the Constitution, and he derides any attempt to use these “much later
interpretations” as “bootstrapping at best.” Instead, Barnett dismisses nineteenth
century cases and authorities due to their being tainted by “[t]he rise of the
Calhounian states rights position.”172
Professor Barnett is inconsistent in his claims about the value of post-adoption
testimony. In other works, Barnett consistently relies on antebellum sources as
evidence supporting his claims of original meaning.173 In the same very article
Barnett dismisses post-adoption federalist readings of the Ninth, he himself relies
on Tucker’s 1803 Treatise on the Constitution and a variety of antebellum state
constitutional amendments, including some adopted as late as 1857.174 Indeed,
Barnett goes so far as to cite 1861 Constitution of the Confederate States (so
much for Calhounian tainted sources!).175 Although I agree with Barnett that the
weight of historical evidence tends to lessen as distance increases between it and
the adoption of the relevant text, all ante-bellum commentary on the Ninth
remains extremely relevant to determining the role that Amendment played in the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment (as my second article makes clear).176
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this article I accept Barnett’s criteria and
present only pre-“Calhounian” commentary on the Ninth Amendment. In fact,
I’ll go further than that. The Supreme Court’s 1820 opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland triggered a vociferous defense of state autonomy that only grew in the
years prior to the Civil War. Accepting Barnett’s premise that this kind of
passion potentially skewed readings of the Ninth Amendment, I will consider
only that commentary regarding the Ninth Amendment that occurred prior to the
Court’s decision in McCulloch v. Maryland. Even in this limited period, express
references to the Ninth abound, and they are uniformly federalist. Some of what
follows is discussed in more detail in my article The Lost Jurisprudence of the
Ninth Amendment. Most of the evidence recounted below, however, was
uncovered during the preparation of this article. I imagine there is much more to
be found.
1.

Discussions of the Ninth Amendment, 1791-1820
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a.

The 1796 “Political Catechism” of Elhanan Winchester

In 1796, the Reverend Elhanan Winchester published “A plain political
catechism intended for the use of schools, in the United States of America:
wherein the great principles of liberty, and of the federal government, are laid
down and explained, in the way of question and answer.” A friend of
Declaration of Independence signatory Benjamin Rush, Elhanan had recently
returned to the United States after having spent seven year successfully preaching
in England. Although Winchester was out of the country during the ratification
debates, when he looked at the words of the Ninth Amendment, he saw the same
federalist principles as James Madison. Here is his section on the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments:
Question XLI.
What rights and powers remain to the individual states?
Answer:
All the powers not delegated to the United States, by the
constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people. And the enumeration in the
constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people. So that a great number
of rights and powers, which the several states individually claim,
remain perfectly to them, notwithstanding this constitution.177
Like Madison, the Rev. Winchester viewed the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as
federalist guardians of reserved state rights and powers. Nor was Winchester a
proto- Calhounian: The good Reverend was an abolitionist.
b.

John Page’s 1799 Remonstrance Against the Alien and Sedition
Acts

In both his book and his most recent article, Randy Barnett presents a dialogue
between Theodore Sedgwick and future Virginia governor John Page during the
debates over the Bill of Rights.178 The discussion involved whether adding the
specific right of assembly to the First Amendment brought the Bill down to a
level of trivial rights (like the right to wear a hat) that could never be
exhaustively listed. Page’s response was that men had in fact been forced to pull
off their hats in the past, and because the right to assemble had likewise been
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denied in the past it was worth adding the right to the list.179 Barnett cites the
exchange to illustrate the personal nature of retained rights and claims that “[t]his
exchange stands in sharp contrast with the collective rights model” because the
discussion only involved references to “the people’s” individual rights. If
Barnett means to imply that men like Page understood the people’s retained
rights to include only (or even mainly) individual or personal rights, this is
rebutted by John Page himself. Only a few years after his discussion with
Sedgwick, Page expressly described the Ninth Amendment as protecting the
retained rights of the States.
In his 1799 campaign pamphlet, John Page argued that the Alien and Sedition
Acts were “not only unnecessary, impolitic and unjust, but unconstitutional.”180
According to Page, the Acts violated the retained rights of the states as protected
by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments (which he refers to as the 11th and 12th
articles).
The power therefore which Congress has claimed and exercised
in enacting the Alien Act, not having been granted by the people
in their constitution, but on the contrary having been claimed and
hitherto wisely and patriotically exercised by the state
legislatures, for the benefit of individual states, and for the safety
of the general government, must be among those powers, which
not having been granted to Congress, nor denied to the states, are
declared by the 11th and twelfth articles of the amendments to
the constitution to be reserved to the states respectively , and
therefore the alien act is an encroachment on those rights, and
must be unconstitutional. . . . Because it is an interference with,
and an encroachment on, the reserved rights of the individual
states (see the 11th and 12th articles of the amendments).181
Page speaks interchangeably about reserved state rights and reserved state
powers. Both are protected by the combined effect of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. In fact, Page argued that the Ninth Amendment actually enhanced
the federalist effect of the Tenth. In another part of his essay, Page addressed a
Report by the Virginia Minority that defended the Acts as falling within the
implied powers of Congress.182 The Minority Report pointed out that under the
earlier Articles of Confederation, the states retained all powers not “expressly”
179
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delegated to the federal government. The Tenth Amendment, however, omitted
the term “expressly” and thus implied a broader range of federal authority under
the new Constitution. Page rejected this reading of the Tenth and argued that the
combination of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments expressed the same limited
reading of federal power as that declared by Article II of the Articles of
Confederation. Because this is a newly discovered discussion of the Ninth
Amendment by a Founder involved with its framing, I have provided an extended
excerpt:
For how could it be supposed when the 2d article of the
confederation declared that “Each state retains its sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and
right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to
the United States, in Congress assembled” and the design of
appointing a convention and the authority given by the different
confederated states to that convention went no farther than to
“render the then Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies
of government and the preservation of the union.”(neither of
which could require farther powers in government than are
expressly granted) that although the convention omitted the
insertion of a familiar article; where as unnecessary in their
opinion or, through design (such as seems now avowed) as the
amendment was made, and as these words preceded it in the 11th
article “the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people”
I say considering these things, how could it be possible to
suppose, that these two amendments taken together, were not
sufficient to justify every citizen in saying, that the powers not
delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people, as fully and completely; as if the word expressly had
been inserted? . . and candor and respect for the majority of
congress which recommended the amendments ought to induce
us to think, that they also were of the same opinion [that the 2d
art. of the art’s still operated] and therefore that they would not
have recommended the addition of the 11th and 12th articles to the
constitution, had they not been called upon by some states for
such amendments.183
Page was a member of Congress that helped frame and submit the Bill of Rights,
including the Ninth Amendment. He was a member of the House when Madison
gave his speech on the Bank of the United States and he represents yet another
Virginian who had a distinctly federalist vision of the Ninth Amendment. For
years, historians have believed the Ninth Amendment played little, if any, role in
the debates over the Alien and Sedition Acts. In the process of preparing this
article, however, I discovered not only Page’s arguments, but also others who
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criticized the Acts as violations of the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments.184
Page’s testimony, however, is particularly significant as a fellow member of
Congress who both helped frame the Ninth and agreed with Madison’s federalist
reading of the Clause.
c.

St. George Tucker’s 1803 “View of the Constitution”

A judge on the Supreme Court of Virginia, Tucker’s 1803 View of the
Constitution was the most influential constitutional treatise in the United States
prior to 1833 when Joseph Story published his Commentaries on the
Constitution. Tucker’s View of the Constitution was the state’s rights treatise of
the early 19th century. Joseph Story later attacked Tucker’s work (including his
writing on the Ninth Amendment) as the prime example of the erroneous states’
rights-protective “compact theory” of the Constitution.185 Tucker was so devoted
to states rights that throughout his life he refused to believe that the Articles of
Confederation had been abrogated by the adoption of the federal Constitution.186
As one would expect, Tucker’s views of the Ninth Amendment reflect his
overarching theory of a federalist constitution as a compact between the states
and the federal government.
Tucker’s federalist view of the Ninth appears in the very first section of Tucker’s
“View of the Constitution.” There, Tucker addresses the people’s fundamental
collective right to alter or abolish their form of government whenever they see fit.
It must be owned that Mr. Locke, and other theoretical writers,
have held, that “there remains still inherent in the people a
supreme power to remove or alter the legislative when they find
the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them; for, when
such trust is abused, it is thereby forfeited, and devolves to those
who gave it.” Fn: This principle is expressly recognized in our
government, Amendments to the C.U.S. Art. 11, 12.[the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments]187
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Here, Tucker links the Ninth Amendment to the people’s retained collective right
to revolution.188 There is no reference to individual rights.189 Instead, Tucker
speaks of powers devolving to the people on a state by state basis (thus the
pairing with the Tenth Amendment). As did Madison, Tucker understood that
the concepts “powers and rights” are inextricably linked—a delegated right is an
extension of power, and a retained right is a reservation of power.190 In this case,
people’s retained right to revolution includes the right to recall a delegation of
power when the government abuses its trust. More, the reference to the Tenth
Amendment exemplifies Tucker’s view that the “people” exist as independent
sovereigns in the several states. There is much more that can to be said about St.
George Tucker’s federalist reading of the Constitution.191 For now, it is enough
to note that although Barnett discusses St. George Tucker at length in his recent
article, he appears to have missed Tucker’s expressly federalist rendering of the
Ninth Amendment in the above passage.192
Despite Barnett’s best efforts to read libertarian theory into the writing of St.
George Tucker, Tucker’s View of the Constitution remains one of the most
closely reasoned and influential works of federalist theory to emerge in the early
period of the Constitution.193 His views of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
reflected this same theory. One final point: Tucker was an abolitionist.194
d.

1805: The Earliest Discovered State Court Application of the Ninth—By
a Ratifier of the Constitution195
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John Overton was a member of the second North Carolina Ratifying Convention.
Although, the first state convention neither accepted nor rejected the
Constitution, the second convention in 1789 voted in favor of ratification.
Overton went on to join the Tennessee bench and there presided over case that
contains one of the earliest state judicial references to the Ninth Amendment.
The background issue involved whether a state property judgement was binding
on a portion of land falling within Indian territory. Overton holds that it is, based
in part on the retained sovereignty of the states as protected under the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. Once again, as a newly uncovered piece of historical
evidence regarding the Ninth, I provide an extended excerpt:
But how far has the Constitution and laws of the United States,
made in pursuance of it, abridged the sovereign rights of each
State? The answer is easy. No further than the States have
expressly, and not by equitable construction, delegated authority
to the United States. The Constitution of the United States was
proposed to each State possessing the rights of sovereignty
within their respective limits. It proposed that each State should
give up a portion of its sovereignty for the more secure and
convenient enjoyment of the remainder.
This construction is conformable to the law of nature applied to
nations. By this law, nations as well as individuals are tenacious
of the rights of self-preservation, of which, as applied to
sovereign States, the right of soil or eminent domain is one.
Constitutions, treaties, or laws, in derogation of these rights are
to be construed strictly. Vattel is of this opinion, and, what is
more satisfactory, the Federalist, and the American author of the
Notes to Blackstone's Commentaries, two of the most eminent
writers on jurisprudence, are of the same opinion. [Here Judge
Overton cites, among other things, the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, and Tucker’s discussion of the same.196]

on July 21 and adjourning on August 4. At that convention, the convention drafted a
"Declaration of Rights" and a list of "Amendments to the Constitution," but in the end,
the convention voted "neither to ratify nor reject the Constitution proposed for the
government of the United States." Another state convention met later the next year, and
in the face of the ratifications of eleven other states, the state drafted a short ratification
message. Added to it were the Declaration and Amendments list adopted the year before.
The following text is taken from the Library of Congress's copy of Elliot's Debates. The
Declaration and Amendments lists follow the message.”
From the online “Tennessee Encyclopedia of History and Culture”: John Overton 17661833. “Overton represented Sumner County as a delegate to the 1789 North Carolina
Convention to ratify the U.S. Constitution.” “In August 1804 Overton was elected to
succeed [Andrew] Jackson as a member of the Superior Court of Tennessee, the
forerunner of the Tennessee Supreme Court. He served on that court until 1810 . . ..”
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The footnote in full reads: “See vat. B. 2 c, 17, §§ 305, 308; Amendment to Con. U. S.
arts 11, 12; 1 T. Bl. app. to part 1, 307. 308: Ib. 412; Vat. B. 1, c., § 10; 2 Dall. 384; 1 T.
Bl. app. to part 1, 269; 4 Johns., 163.”
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The Constitution of the United States gave the power to the
General Government to regulate intercourse with the Indians and
to make treaties. The States, having conceded these powers, no
longer possess them. The Constitution was a dead letter until the
treaties and the laws of the United States pointed out the
principles of this intercourse. By treaty certain lands within the
limits of the State are in its language "allotted, granted, and
secured to the Indians, within which the citizens are not to hunt,
drive stock, survey, nor even go there without permission. If they
do, or commit other trespasses, they are subject to heavy
penalties. But does the Constitution of the United States or its
laws take from the sovereign rights of the State further than is
incompatible with these regulations? They do not.197
Overton reads the Ninth as preserving the retained rights of the states. He has no
difficulty in finding this same federalist reading of the Ninth in the works of St.
George Tucker. Like Tucker, Overton read the Ninth and Tenth as creating a
rule of strict construction of federal power, preserving where possible the
concurrent power of the states. And this by one of the ratifier’s of the original
Constitution.
1811: Defending the State’s Right to Grant a Steamboat Monopoly
New York’s decision to grant Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton a
monopoly on ferryboat traffic between ports in New Jersey and Manhattan Island
triggered a series of lawsuits that culminated with the Supreme Court’s
invalidation of the monopoly in Gibbons v. Ogden. In the decades prior to that
case, however, the monopoly had been successfully defended before the New
York courts. In 1811, an anonymous author published an extended defense of
the monopoly arguing, among things, that the states retained the right to grant
monopolies under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments:
It is hardly necessary to add that the 12th amendment can have no
other influence on this question than to strengthen this position.
This amendment was made, not to give additional powers to the
Federal Government, not one of them tending to this object, but
to guard the states against a constructive extension of those
powers. If then certain powers were by a fair construction
equally within the jurisdiction of Congress and the States
respectively, such power could not by force of this restrictive
amendment, be taken from the states and vested in Congress,
particularly when the preceding article of the amendment,
contains an express provision against this constructive
assumption of power. 11th Art. “The enumeration in the
constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people;” thus the enumeration of
the right of arming the militia, and maintaining a Navy shall not

197

See Glasgow's Lessee v. Smith, 1 Tenn. 144, (1805) at *14 (Westlaw pagination) .

54

disparage the right that the States have to arm the militia or to
keep a navy in time of war.198
The author reads the Ninth as guarding against constructive extensions of federal
power in matters involving the concurrent authority of the States. As we shall
see, this Ninth Amendment-based defense of concurrent state power will be
adopted by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story in a case involving,
coincidentally enough, concurrent state powers over matters involving the
militia. Like John Page, the author reads the Ninth as enhancing the federalist
protections of the Tenth Amendment. Nothing here involves individual rights.
This is purely a matter of the retained rights of state majorities.
e.

The Continued Debates Regarding the Bank of the United States

Although in 1791 Madison failed to convince a majority to reject the Bank of the
United States, his arguments continued to resonate over the next two decades. In
1811, during the congressional debate over renewing the Bank charter, opponents
agreed with Madison that the latitude of construction pressed by the Bank’s
proponents exceeded congressional power. As Representative William Burwell
pointed out to the assembly, the subject of the Bank had been “more thoroughly
examined in 1791 & more ably elucidated than any other since the adoption of
the government; the celebrated speech of Mr. Madison, to which I ascribe my
conviction, has been recently presented to us in the newspapers, and gentlemen
must be familiar with it.199 Representative W. T. Barry echoed Burwell’s praise
of Madison’s “perspicuous and luminous argument that has been so justly
celebrated as defining and marking out the proper limits of power assigned to the
general government.”200 These men obviously would be aware of how Madison
relied on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Others expressly raised the Ninth.
According to Representative (and future Vice President) Richard Johnson:
The enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”
which amendment refers to the prohibitions to be found in the 9th
section of the1st article, and others of the same kind [listing
examples]. And more especially the Tenth Amendment, viz
[quoting the Tenth]. The parts of the constitution recited prove
the position taken that, that the Constitution is a grant of
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specified powers; that we can exercise no power not expressly
delegated to us.”201
Likewise, Representative William Crawford argued:
Congress cannot therefore usurp this power over the states, so
expressly & explicitly reserved without a flagrant violation of
this (not an interpolation as it has been jesuitically styled, but)
integral part of the Constitution. This opinion is confirmed by
article 9th, amendments to the constitution, which declares, that
the enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
But the people have retained the right to establish banks—for all
powers not delegated to the people [sic202], or prohibited to the
states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people.203
[Power to incorporate a bank] is of too imperious a nature to be
sought for by implication, inclusion or as an incidental means to
carry any other power into effect . . . If it had ever been parted
with, it was all-important that it should have been parted with
expressly.204
The same Ninth Amendment-based arguments were raised in the Senate. Senator
William Giles, for example, recounted the concerns that led to the adoption of a
Constitution that reserved all unenumerated powers to the states:
From this short history of the origins of the Constitution, and the
causes which produced it, it evidently appears, that the general or
federal government is in its nature and character a government of
enumerated powers taken from previously existing states
governments, enumerated and conferred on it, reserving all
unenumerated powers to the state governments, or to the people
in their individual capacities. But if any doubts had existed on
this subject, two amendments to the constitution, growing out of
some jealousies lest a contrary interpretation should be given to
the constitution, have been adopted, which ought to put this
question to rest forever. The 9th and 10th articles of amendment
to the constitution are as follows [quotes both the Ninth and
Tenth]. Now sir, can language be more explicit than this, in
declaring that this charter contains enumerated powers and that
all not enumerated are reserved to the states or to the people?205
201
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The Bank’s proponents disagreed that the charter violated the Ninth Amendment,
but they accepted the federalist nature of the clause. For example, Senator John
Taylor argued that Congress had not rigorously applied the Ninth Amendment in
the past and that if one took the obvious meaning of the Ninth Amendment to its
logical conclusion, Congress could not operate:
“Mr. Giles has called attention of the Senate to the 9th article of
the amendments to the constitution [quotes the amendment] . . . I
know not how Mr. Adams found the states so much asleep to
their rights when he tempted their citizens to become usurers,
and this too in denial and disparagement of state powers actually
exercised. If the present vigilance had then been exerted I
should suppose he was very lucky, that he was not as much
harassed as were some of the victims of the sedition law. Carry
this doctrine of rigid construction in respect to this instance of
collision of state and United State authorities to the extent
contended for by the opposers of the bill—enforce to the fullest
extent, according to its obvious meaning, the amendment last
quoted, and we shall be surrounded with powers that we dare not
use.
f.

The Retained Concurrent Powers of the States

In 1807, a petition was sent to Congress on behalf of “sundry citizens of the
United States” asking that Congress allow the state courts concurrent jurisdiction
over diversity cases despite the preferences of the plaintiff. The petition
grounded its argument on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments which, to the
petitioners, preserved wherever possible the concurrent powers of the states.206
In 1808, Senator James Lloyd argued cited the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as
limiting federal regulation of commerce. The argument had nothing to do with
individual rights, and everything to do with state autonomy. 207 In the murder
trial of Cyrus Dean, the Supreme Court of Vermont rejected a claim that an alien
freeholder cannot serve as a grand juror due to exclusive federal authority over
immigrants. According to the Court, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
established the state’s retained concurrent right to determine the rights of alien
freeholders within the state.208
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In 1816, South Carolina courts were faced with the question whether states have
the authority to prosecute persons passing counterfeit federal coins.209 Although
the Constitution expressly empowers the federal government to punish
counterfeiters,210 it was not clear whether this express enumeration should be
interpreted to prohibit the concurrent power of the states to punish persons
passing counterfeit coins. Writing for the South Carolina Supreme Court, Judge
Grimke noted that the Constitution does not expressly grant Congress the power
to punish persons passing counterfeit coins.211 Applying a rule of construction
based on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, Judge Grimke concluded that this,
then, was a power retained by the states:
[I]t does not appear that the power of punishing persons for
passing counterfeit coin, knowing it to be counterfeit, was either
expressly given to the Congress of the United States, or divested
out of the individual States. Now the 9th section of the
amendments to the constitution, as agreed to by the several
States, and which has now become a component part of the
constitution, declares, that the enumeration in the constitution of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people; and in the 10th section of the same, it is
further provided, that the powers not delegated to the United
States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the State, are
reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people. When we
examine the powers conceded by the individual states, we find
no enumeration of this power given to Congress, and when we
review the powers denied to the individual States, we discover
no mention whatever of their being divested of this power. The
individual States were in possession of this power before the
ratification of the constitution of the United States; and if there is
no express declaration in that instrument, which deprives them of
it, they must still retain it, unless they should be divested thereof
by construction or implication.212
Grimke read the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as applying to powers exercised
by the states prior to the adoption of the Constitution.213 If such powers are not
expressly granted to the federal government or divested from the states, then
under the Ninth Amendment, enumerated federal power should be interpreted in
209. State v. Antonio, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 562 (1816).
210. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (“[Congress shall have power] [t]o provide for the
Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States.”).
211. Antonio, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) at 567–68.
212. Id.
213. From Judge Nott’s dissent in this case, it appears the Ninth Amendment was the
primary clause relied on to support concurrent jurisdiction:
“The advocates for a concurrent jurisdiction derive no support from the
amendment of the constitution which has been relied on. It does not say that the
powers not expressly delegated, &c., shall be reserved; but that the enumeration
of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people; and whether by express or necessary implication, the effect is the
same.”
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a manner retaining such rights to the states. Other courts repeated this idea of
retained concurrent state power. In Livingston v. Van Ingen, the state of New
York had granted a ferry monopoly to Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton214 by
virtue of their “new and advantageous” mode of transportation.215 A competitor
claimed that granting such monopolies was an exclusive power of the federal
government under its enumerated powers to “promote the progress of science and
useful arts” and to regulate interstate commerce.216 Livingston’s counsel Thomas
A. Emmet217 responded that the federal government had only such power as was
expressly granted and that all other powers were reserved to the states under the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments.218
In 1817, state supreme court judge William Tilghman embraced the same
federalist reading of the Ninth Amendment:
Antecedent to the adoption of the Federal constitution, the power
of the several states was supreme and unlimited. It follows,
therefore, that all power, not transferred to the United States,
remains in the states and the people, according to their several
constitutions. This would have been the sound construction of
the constitution, without amendment. But the jealousy of those,
who feared that the federal government would absorb all the

214. This monopoly would be the subject of a great deal of litigation. See, e.g.,
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In North River Steamboat Co. v.
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another in New York waters. See id. at 182–84. The court ignored his argument, ruling
instead that his ferry run was protected under the holding of Gibbons v. Ogden, since it
involved stops on both the New York and New Jersey sides of the water. Id. at 227–28.
215. 9 Johns. 507, 508 (N.Y. 1812).
216. Id. at 515.
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powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor
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to the people.” The convention of this state adopted the constitution
with the explanation given by General Hamilton, who was a member,
that no powers were conferred on congress but such as were explicitly
given by the constitution.
Livingston, 9 Johns. at 550–51.
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power of the states, caused it to be expressly recognized in the
11th and 12th articles of amendment.”219
Judge Tilghman was a member of the Federalist Party and likely shared his
Party’s broad view of national power. This makes all the more significant his
embrace of a state-protective reading of the Ninth Amendment.
g.

1820: The First Supreme Court Discussion of the Ninth Amendment

In 1820 John Taylor of Caroline declared in his book Construction Construed
and Constitutions Vindicated, “[t]he [Ninth Amendment] prohibits a construction
by which the rights retained by the people shall be denied or disparaged; and the
[Tenth] ‘reserves to the state respectively or to the people the powers not
delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the states’. The precision of
these expressions is happily contrived to defeat a construction, by which the
origin of the union, or the sovereignty of the states, could be rendered at all
doubtful.”220 Taylor was an ardent states-rights advocate, and his thoughts on the
Ninth Amendment perhaps should be taken with a grain of salt, especially given
the distance from the original ratification of the Ninth Amendment. The same
year Taylor published his book, however, the very nationalist Joseph Story
embraced the very same view of the Ninth Amendment.
The first discussion of the Ninth Amendment in a Supreme Court case (only
recently identified) occurred in Houston v. Moore (1820)221 in an opinion by
Justice Joseph Story. Once again, the decision was handed down before the rise
of Calhoun’s nullification doctrine, and Justice Story is not known for his
favoring of states’ rights. Nevertheless, according to Justice Story, the letter and
spirit of the Ninth Amendment called for a narrow reading of federal power in
order to preserve the concurrent powers of the states.
Houston involved the question of whether the states retained the concurrent
power to established disciplinary rules for the militia, given the express
enumerated power of Congress to regulate the militia. The case did not involve
any claimed individual right. This important and influential case deserves more
space than I can devote to it here.222 In brief, the majority upheld the state
disciplinary action, drawing a dissent from Justice Story. In that dissent, Story
laid out what he viewed as the proper approach to determining concurrent state
power over a given subject. His opinion is worth reading in full as an early
219
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example of how the Ninth Amendment can be applied in a live case or
controversy. For our purposes, it is enough to simply quote Story’s declaration
that “it seems unquestionable that the states retain concurrent authority with
Congress, not only upon the letter and spirit of the [ninth] amendment of the
constitution, but upon the soundest principles of general reasoning.223
To the dismay of those who supported his nomination to the Court, Joseph Story
was a nationalist. He had no incentive to find state-protective provisions in the
Bill of Rights or anywhere else in the constitution. Nevertheless, Story follows
the traditional account of the Ninth and views it—wholly apart from the Tenth
Amendment—as a provision that guards the concurrent authority of the states.
Story’s discussion of the Ninth Amendment was quoted in later Supreme Court
cases, and Story’s reading of the Ninth was echoed by countless state and federal
court judges for the next one hundred years. In fact, an early compendium of the
opinions of John Marshall included Story’s opinion in Houston, since the great
Chief Justice apparently joined Story’s dissent.224
Summation
At some point the mercy rule should apply. I have not selected only federalist
references to the Ninth by courts and commentators and omitted others. There
are no such references to a libertarian Ninth during this period.225 With the
exception of a defendant’s attempt to use the Ninth (and Tenth!) in support of the
right to trial by jury—an attempt ignored by the court—the historical record is
devoid of libertarian readings of the Ninth Amendment.226 Scholarly and judicial
commentary is extensive and uniformly federalist and I have no doubt that
further research will uncover many more examples. Indeed, I seem to uncover
more every time I run a general search in a historical database. Many of the
above examples were uncovered just during the preparation of this article.
I have limited my analysis of post-adoption commentary in deference to
Barnett’s claim that later sources might be tainted by Calhounian state rights
theory in the years leading up to the Civil War. There is much more, and, again,
I believe that all pre-Civil War commentary is relevant to the impact of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But even under this limited view of the evidence, the
record is unequivocal: From the moment of its submission to the states to its
earliest application in state and federal court, the Ninth Amendment was broadly
viewed as a provision guarding the retained sovereignty of the states. This
223. Houston, 18 U.S. at 48–50 (Story, J., dissenting). In the actual quote, Story refers
to the Ninth as the “eleventh” amendment, reflecting an early custom of referring to the
first ten amendments according to their placement on an original list of twelve proposed
amendments. Our Ninth was 11th” on that list.
224
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testimony includes those involved with the drafting of the amendment and its
ratification.
2.

The Tenth Amendment

The ubiquitous pairing of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments not only highlights
the federalist character of the Ninth, it also shows how the Tenth as well as the
Ninth was read as establishing a rule of strict construction of federal power. The
text of the Tenth does not expressly announce such a rule (one of the reasons
why Randolph did not think it would have “much effect”). It is clear however,
that the Tenth quickly came to be viewed as establishing a federalist rule of
construction. As I have written elsewhere, ultimately the Tenth would eclipse the
Ninth as the primary textual expression of federalist interpretation of the
Constitution.227
Although there are earlier examples,228 perhaps the biggest reason why states
rights theorists came to emphasize the Tenth over the Ninth involves what came
to be known as James Madison’s “Celebrated Report of 1800.”229 This extended
defense of the Virginia Resolutions against the Alien and Sedition Acts explored
in detail the Resolutions’ claim that the Acts violated a number of constitutional
principles, including those announced by the First and Tenth Amendments. The
Report became the federalists “magna charta” and found its way into almost
every tract and essay on state rights during the nineteenth century.230 It clearly
influenced St. George Tucker’s View of the Constitution, who cites to the Report
repeatedly and shares Madison's use of the Tenth in the Report as counseling a
narrow construction of federal power.231 Given the status of Madison’s Report
and the influence of Tucker’s treatise, it is not surprising that Madison’s Tenth
Amendment-based defense of state rights established the general argument upon
which later states rights theory would be based. It is important to note, however,
that the rise of the Tenth was not accompanied by a decline in federalist readings
of the Ninth. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Ninth
Amendment continued to be read in tandem with the Tenth as one of the dual
guardians of federalism and states’ rights.232
Randy Barnett believes that Madison’s decision to rely on the Tenth and not the
Ninth in his Celebrated Report undermines my claims about the federalist Ninth.
According to Barnett, if the Ninth Amendment calls for a limited reading of
federal power in order to preserve state autonomy, then Madison should have
relied on the Ninth in his objections to the Alien and Sedition Acts.233 Barnett
further claims that Madison’s emphasis on the Tenth shows that this Amendment
227
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and not the Ninth was understood as a rule of construction guarding states
rights.234
There are a number of problems with this argument. To begin with, Barnett
seems unaware of the many federalist uses of the Ninth Amendment during the
same period.235 Whatever else one might conclude about the Alien and Sedition
Act controversy, one cannot conclude that the Ninth was not understood at the
time as a federalist rule of construction. There are too many examples to the
contrary. Secondly, we know that men like John Page did rely on federalist
readings of the Ninth in their opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts.236
Finally, nothing in Madison’s Report repudiates, or even undermines, his earlier
express statements about the Ninth Amendment. Barnett tries to imply otherwise
by making it seem that if it was possible to use the Ninth, then Madison should
have used the Ninth. Because he did not, this means that the Ninth was not
understood as a federalist rule of construction. But this is a logical fallacy: One
cannot get “should have” out of “could have.”
In fact, there was good reason for Madison to discuss the Tenth and not the Ninth
Amendment, even if a Ninth Amendment argument was possible. Although
Madison’s Report addressed arguments against the Alien and Sedition Acts, this
was not its primary purpose. Madison’s Report was a defense the Virginia
Resolutions at time when political backlash from those Resolutions threatened to
derail the political hopes of the Republican Party.237 Because the Resolutions
based their argument on the First and Tenth Amendments, defending them
required Madison to do the same.
In December of 1798, the Virginia Legislature adopted and promulgated the
(in)famous “Virginia Resolutions.” Ghost-written by James Madison, the
Resolutions declared that the Alien and Sedition Acts were a “deliberate,
palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact
[the Constitution].”238 Because the “Acts aforesaid were unconstitutional” the
states therefore were “duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of
evil.”239 Accordingly, the “General Assembly doth solemnly appeal to the like
dispositions of the other States in confidence that they will concur with this
Commonwealth,” and will “cooperat[e] with this state in maintaining unimpaired
the authorities, rights, and liberties reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people.”240
This was no ordinary objection to an Act of Congress. Earlier controversies like
that involving the Bank of the United States had raised the issue of proper
interpretation of enumerated federal power. In this case, however, Virginia
accused the federal government of deliberately exercising an extra-constitutional
234
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power and the Assembly called upon other states to join them in “interposing”
against enforcement of the Acts. This incendiary action241 threatened the
continued stability of union. Madison was well aware of delicacy of the situation
and he feared that the Assembly’s Resolutions might be read as usurping the
people’s ultimate right to decide whether there had been an unacceptable breach
in the constitutional compact.242 As it turned out, the Resolutions were roundly
rejected by the other states whose assemblies issued stinging rebukes against
Virginia and Kentucky’s unjustified and dangerous tilt towards disunion.243 The
backlash put the Republicans on the defensive at just the moment when they
hoped political opposition to the Acts would lead to victory in the presidential
elections of 1800. It was politically important that the Resolutions receive a
strong defense, and Madison provided one in spades with his “Report of the
Committee to Whom were Referred the Communications of Various States,
Relative to the Resolutions of the Last General Assembly of this State,
Concerning the Alien and Sedition Laws,” or, as it came to be known, Madison’s
Celebrated Report.”244
As Barnett points out, although Madison’s Report addresses the proper
construction of federal power, its arguments are based on the First and Tenth
Amendments, not the Ninth.245 Although Barnett believes this proves Madison
did not read the Ninth as a rule of construction protecting the states from
overweening federal power, his claim misunderstands the purpose of the Report.
The Virginia Resolutions were short and to the point: Congress had done more
than merely adopted a “latitudinary” construction of its enumerated powers. It
had clearly and intentionally sought to exercise an unenumerated power.246 This
is not a Ninth Amendment issue—this is a Tenth Amendment issue. It was
because of this serious and “palpable” violation that Virginia believed a
coordinated act of opposition was warranted.247 In his defense of the
Resolutions, Madison could not rely on Ninth Amendment arguments of undue
241
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construction of enumerated power. This would not justify the more serious
assertions of the Virginia Resolutions, and it would reduce the issue to the same
issue as the Bank controversy—a controversy neither Madison nor anyone else
believed warranted coordinated state opposition.248 His Report accordingly ties
all of its arguments to the basic point that Congress had exercised a power
nowhere granted in the Constitution.249
The rise of the Tenth Amendment as an independent federalist rule of
construction is an important story in its own right.250 Madison’s focus on the
Tenth in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions, however, does not undermine
his express description of the Ninth in his speech on the Bank of the United
States, nor does it conflict with the many other examples of federalist
applications of the Ninth during the same period. Madison’s speech does show
how application of the two amendments may overlap, but that cannot come as
any surprise. Madison himself linked the two as supporting the general rule of
limited interpretation of federal power in his speech on the Bank of the United
States. We also know that post-adoption courts and commentators all saw the
two amendments as expressing closely related principles of preserved state
autonomy.
Randy Barnett’s attempt to read the Tenth as independently establishing a rule of
construction for both enumerated and unenumerated federal power, while at the
same time reading the Ninth as only applying to retained individual natural
rights, is not only unsupported by the evidence, it is ironic. It places Barnett in
the position of arguing that the Ninth Amendment means less than what it says
(protecting only some retained rights), while the Tenth Amendment means more
(serving as a rule of construction when there is no such rule in the text). The
federalist reading of both amendments, on the other hand, allows them their full
248
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effect and no more. The Ninth guards retained rights (not just retained individual
natural rights), and the Tenth reserves all non-delegated power to the states
respectively, or to the people.
V.

The Fourteenth Amendment

This article has focused on the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment. If one
seeks the original meaning of the Constitution in order to vindicate the sovereign
right of the people to establish fundamental law, however, then one must
consider the impact of later amendments on the original scope and operative
effect of the Ninth Amendment. The people, after all, have the sovereign right to
alter or abolish constitutional principles as they see fit.251 Of particular
importance is the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever the scope of
local autonomy under the original Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment
significantly reduced that autonomy when it comes to the privileges or
immunities of United States citizens, or state laws that impact the right to due
process or equal protection under the law. In this way, the original meaning of
the Ninth Amendment must be synthesized with the original meaning of the
Fourteenth.
A comprehensive theory of the Ninth Amendment that takes into consideration
the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment and establishes the rules for
contemporary judicial enforcement is beyond the scope of this particular paper.252
Nevertheless, because Randy Barnett makes a number of claims regarding the
application of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, it is appropriate to at least
sketch how the historical evidence informs the intended relationship between
these two critical amendments.
a.

The Ninth Amendment and Incorporation Doctrine

Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that “no state shall” abridge
the privileges of immunities of United States citizens or deny any person the
right to due process or equal protection under law. This restriction on state
power carves out a portion of rights previously retained by state majorities and
places them beyond the reach of the political process. The current scholarly
debate involves the content of these rights; for example whether they include
some or all of the first eight amendments, or whether they (also) include certain
unenumerated rights such as the right to privacy or the common law right to
pursue a trade.253 No scholar or judge, however, has ever suggested that the
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Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Ninth Amendment. From the earliest
incorporation cases to modern doctrine, the Court has consistently limited the
scope of incorporation doctrine to the first eight amendments.254
The history surrounding then adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment supports
the long-standing position of the courts that neither the Ninth nor Tenth
Amendment are proper candidates for incorporation. Throughout the first half of
the nineteenth century, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were viewed as
preserving the autonomy of the states.255 Despite the incentive to raise every
possible liberty claim in opposition to slavery, abolitionists never referred to the
Ninth Amendment in support of their cause. Instead, in the years leading up to
the Civil War, both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were invoked on behalf of
slavery and the right of states to secede from the Union.256 It is no surprise then
that the man who drafted Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, John
Bingham, left both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments off of his list of individual
privileges or immunities protected against state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment.257 In sum, the approach of courts and commentators seems well
supported by the historical record: The Fourteenth Amendment was neither
intended nor understood to incorporate the Ninth.
Although he has no historical evidence for his conclusion, Randy Barnett
believes it is reasonable to assume that the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges
or Immunities Clause “refer to the same set of unenumerable rights.”258 In light
of evidence presented in this paper, however, this seems clearly incorrect.259 As
we have seen, the evidence strongly suggests that the retained rights of the Ninth
included collective majoritarian rights that, by definition, cannot logically be
incorporated against state majorities (for example, the concurrent power of local
majorities to regulate the state militia). Incorporating these majoritarian rights
against the states would make no more sense than incorporating the Tenth
Amendment against the states. If our reading of the historical record is correct,
and at least some of the rights protected under the Ninth Amendment were
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collective in nature, then the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot protect
the same set of rights.
Once we understand that the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments do not protect
the same set of rights, this means that the rights of the Ninth Amendment must be
reconciled with the rights of the Fourteenth. For example, we know that the
original Ninth Amendment prohibited the extension of federal authority into any
matter meant to be left under state majoritarian control. This potentially included
everything from chartering a bank to establishing a religion to providing due
process for deprivation of life liberty and property. The Fourteenth Amendment,
however, substantially altered this arrangement and removed broad categories of
rights from the local control of the States. More, under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the federal government now gained regulatory power
over matters originally denied to the federal government. In this way, the
Fourteenth Amendment significantly altered the original scope of the Ninth.
On the other hand, whatever the substantive content of the Fourteenth
Amendment, at some point a limit is reached regarding the plausible meaning of
“privileges or immunities of United States’ citizens,” “due process” and “equal
protection.” The retained rights of the Ninth remain in effect to the extent that
they have not been abrogated (or transformed) by the Fourteenth. Put another
way, where the enumerated rights of the Fourteenth end, the remnant rights of the
Ninth Amendment begin.
The task then is to determine which of the retained rights protected by the
original Ninth remain under state control, and which are now protected against
state action by the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, the original
Constitution conferred no express power over the subject of education. Although
one could construe the Interstate Commerce Clause broadly enough to bring all
education within national control, this is a good candidate for that kind of
latitudinarian interpretation forbidden by the Ninth Amendment. Local control
of public education thus is likely one of the rights retained by the collective
people in the several states. Unless the Fourteenth Amendment transformed
public education into an individual right, this means that local control of public
education remains one of the people’s retained unenumerated rights guarded by
the Ninth and unaffected by the Fourteenth.
It is precisely because the federalist principle of the Ninth Amendment remains
alive and well even after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment that Randy
Barnett’s “presumption of liberty” cannot be correct in regard to the local
authority of the states. Although a number of retained collective rights were
erased through the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments (state regulation
of slavery, among others), there yet remains an unenumerable set of rights
preserved from federal interference and left under the control of the people in the
several states as a matter of right. Indeed, the Ninth does create a presumption of
liberty, but it runs in precisely the opposite direction as that proposed by Randy
Barnett. Any intrusion upon the retained rights of the people must be justified as
a necessary and proper construction of an enumerated federal power. This is as
true for federal power conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment as it is for federal
power conferred under the original Constitution. This does not mean that the
Ninth trumps the Fourteenth Amendment. As noted above, the Fourteenth
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necessarily carves out large portions of the original Ninth. The degree of impact
the Fourteenth Amendment has on the Ninth, however, must be based on an
interpretation of the enumerated rights and powers of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There are no unenumerated restrictions on the retained rights of the
people.
VI.

Conclusion: The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth

The meaning I ascribe to the Ninth Amendment in this article is the same
meaning embraced by countless jurists and legal theorists for over one hundred
years. At the very least, then, the approach presented here is anything but
idiosyncratic. Perhaps the greatest challenge to this understanding of the original
Ninth Amendment is the modern tendency to view rights and powers through the
lens of the Fourteenth Amendment and presume that state rights rhetoric
generally stands as a crypto-apologia for segregation and slavery.
But views of local autonomy shift with political realignment. Progressive voices
today are raised on behalf of local control of medicine,260 affirmative action
programs,261 and election law.262 There may yet be room for a vision of a
national people with the sovereign right to divide authority between national and
local governments. There is no doubt, however, that this was the view of those
who debated and ratified the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment was
then and, to the extent that original meaning informs current interpretation,
remains today inescapably federalist.
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